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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 Paul Helm, professor of theology and philosophy at Highland Theological 
Institute, has written extensively on God‘s relation to time. Following in the tradition of 
Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, and Aquinas, Helm upholds God‘s temporal mode of 
existence as timelessness. This thesis seeks to determine whether Helm and other 
eternalists are justified in holding that God‘s temporal mode of existence is atemporal in 
light of the doctrines of incarnation and creation. Central to this inquiry is whether God is 
strongly immutable. In conclusion, this thesis argues that while the divine timeless view 
is coherent, it rests on an untenable notion of strong immutability. Scripture teaches that 
God is immutable in His essence, character, decree, plan and purposes, yet, it also affirms 
that God changes in His actions and in His relationships toward his creatures. 
Furthermore, in order to maintain the divine timeless view, Helm and other eternalists 
must appeal to a B-theory of time, which raises several philosophical and theological 
objections. Lastly, this thesis argues for a synthesis approach to God‘s temporal mode of 
existence.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
  
 Paul Helm, professor of theology and philosophy at Highland Theological 
Institute,
1
 has written extensively on God‘s relation to time. Following the classical 
medieval view, Helm upholds God‘s temporal mode of existence as timelessness.2 This 
thesis seeks to determine whether Paul Helm and other eternalists
3
 are justified in holding 
that God‘s temporal mode of existence is atemporal in light of the doctrines of 
incarnation and creation. Central to this inquiry is whether God is strongly immutable.
4
 I 
shall argue that while Helm presents a coherent view of divine eternity, such a view rests 
on an untenable doctrine of strong immutability. Further, it remains possible for the 
Christian theist to maintain God‘s immutability without rendering God as absolutely and 
in all ways mutable.
5
  
                                                 
 
1
 Paul Helm, Eternalism Contra Craig,    
http://paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2008/01/eternalism-contra-craig.html. (April 3, 2008).  
  
 
2
 In the literature of philosophical theology, the terms ‗timelessness,‘ ‗atemporal,‘ and ‗eternal‘ are 
used synonymously. By timeless, Helm means that God is not in time, He has no history, and hence there is 
no past or future for God, only His present. Similar to Boethius, God has before Him the entirety of His life 
existing without any succession or change. See Paul Helm, Eternal God, A Study of God without Time 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 24; Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, Book V: VI.  
 
 
3
 Helm refers to his own position of divine timelessness as the ‗eternalist‘ position or ‗eternalism.‘ 
Henceforth, eternalism will be used to describe the position that God‘s temporal mode of existence is 
timeless. [See Paul Helm, ―Divine Timeless Eternity,‖ in God and Time: Four Views, ed. Gregory Ganssle 
(Downers Gove: InterVarsity Press. 2001), 30.]   
  
 
4
 Paul Helm, Eternal God, 94. Christian theists use the term immutability differently. The word 
‗strong‘ will be used throughout the remainder of the essay to differentiate the eternalist‘s view of 
immutability from other uses of the word. By strongly immutable the eternalist means that God does not 
change nor could He ever change. Aquinas describes God as ―altogether immutable.‖ See Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica, Pt. 1 Q. 9 Art. 1. 
 
 
5
 Bruce Ware distinguishes between God‘s ―ontological‖ and ―ethical‖ immutability and God‘s 
―relational‖ mutability. He argues that God‘s relational mutability expresses more clearly God‘s 
unchangingness ―because God‘s intrinsic moral nature is unchangeable it must always and without fail 
express itself in ways appropriate to the moral state of any given human situation. Thus, when the human 
moral state changes (e.g. from rebellion to repentance) the immutable divine nature must now reflect itself 
in ways that are appropriate to this new situation.‖ See Bruce A. Ware, ―An Evangelical Reformulation of 
2 
 
 Thus, this thesis will unfold in the following way. First, chapter one examines the 
philosophical and theological bases for divine timelessness, followed by Paul Helms 
formulation and defense of the eternalist view. Afterwards, I shall assess whether the 
doctrine of divine timelessness is coherent. Chapter two brings into question the eternalist 
doctrine of strong immutability and presents two objections to the eternalist‘s conception 
of divine timelessness and strong immutability based on the classical Christian doctrines 
of creation and incarnation. Lastly, in chapter three, I shall then suggest a possible model 
for understanding God‘s temporal mode of existence.  
                                                                                                                                                 
the Doctrine of the Immutability of God,‖ in the The Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society (Dec. 
1986), 434, 436, & 438m 440.  
 
3 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
DIVINE TIMELESSNESS AS GOD’S TEMPORAL  
MODE OF EXISTENCE 
 
  
 Regarding God‘s relation to the space-time world, Philosophical theologians have 
historically employed two models – God as ―timeless‖1 and God as ―everlasting‖2 – to 
express God‘s temporal mode of existence.3 By timelessness as God‘s temporal mode of 
existence, the eternalist means that God exists without temporal location or extension. 
God does not exist in time, nor does God have a history consisting of a past, present or 
future.
 4
 Brian Leftow sums up the eternalist position when he says:  
                                                 
 
1
 Modern proponents of the timeless view include: Paul Helm, Eternal God, A Study of God 
without Time (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, ―Eternity.‖ The 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, No. 8 (Aug., 1981), 429-458; Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991).  
 
 
2
 Modern proponents of the everlasting view include: John Feinberg, No One Like Him; Nelson 
Pike, God and Timelessness (New York: Schocken Books, 1970); Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of 
Theism  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 211; Nicholas Wolterstorff, ―God Everlasting,‖ in Contemporary 
Philosophy of Religion, Eds. Steven M. Cahn and David Shatz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 
78. By ―everlasting,‖ also known as ―temporalism,‖ philosophical theologians mean that God exists in 
time. But the question that will be raised in chapter three concerns what temporalists mean by ―in time.‖ 
For it would seem that if God created time, along with everything else at the moment of creation, then God 
would not be a necessary being, since, He began to exist with time. On the other hand, if time has always 
existed, then God could not be a necessary being, since, God would depend on something other than 
Himself for His existence.  
 
 
3
 Philosophers of religion often reserve judgment as to which view best represents God‘s relation 
to time
 
 See Ronald H. Nash, The Concept of God (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1983), 83; Thomas V. 
Morris, Our Idea of God (Vancouver: Regent Press, 1991), 138. Others seek a modified view. William 
Lane Craig and Thomas Senor advocate a view that God has two phases to His life: one timeless and one 
temporal. William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God’s Relationship to Time (Wheaton: 
Crossway Books, 2001), 233; Senor, Thomas. ―Divine Temporality and Creation Ex Nihilo.‖ In Faith and 
Philosophy Vol. 10 No. 1 (January 1993), 87.  Alan Padgett offers a second modified view of God‘s 
relation to time, which he calls ―relative timelessness.‖ By relative timelessness Padgett means that God‘s 
―time is immeasurable.‖ Alan Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and 
Stock Publishers, 1992), 123-130. 
  
4 
 
 If God is timeless, God exists, but exists at no time. Thus God bears no temporal relation to 
any temporal relatum—God does not exist or act earlier than, later than, or at the same time 
as any such thing. If God is timeless, such truths as ‗God exists‘ are timeless truths: though 
they are true, they are not true at any time.
5
 
 
Contra the timeless view, some argue that God is everlasting, i.e., His temporal mode of 
existence is ―in time.‖6  Richard Swinburne maintains that God is ―a being such that 
however far back in time you count years you do not reach the beginning of its 
existence.‖7 Some temporalists doubt the coherence of the doctrine of divine 
timelessness. They argue that such a doctrine does not fit well with other Christian 
beliefs, and that it entered into Christian thought through Greek philosophy. For instance, 
Nicholas Wolterstorff believes that early Christians were problematically influenced by 
Greek metaphysics. He thinks such Greek thought is contradictory to biblical thought and 
concludes that the only way to remove the Hellenistic tradition is through removing the 
timelessly eternal view of God.
8
 ―God the Redeemer,‖ claims Wolterstorff, ―is a God 
who changes. And any being which changes is a being among whose states there is  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4
 Nash, 73; Pike, 15; Helm, Eternal God, 23-24. 
  
 
5
 Leftow, 20. 
  
 
6
 It is important to distinguish ―standard temporalism‖ from ―omnitemporalism.‖ Standard 
temporalism refers to God ―in time‖ but does not qualify what is meant by ―in time;‖ whereas, 
omnitemporalism, as will be shown in chapter three, recognizes that God‘s time, which is metaphysical 
time, cannot be the same as physical clock time or even cosmic time. According to omnitemporalism, God 
completely transcends created space-time, since He is the Creator of space-time, yet, He is available to all 
times that ever exist. There are, however, differences of opinion as to whether metaphysical time is 
measured by cosmic time or whether metaphysical time is immeasurable. 
  
 
7
 Swinburne, 211.  
 
 
8
 Swinburne, 217; Wolterstorff, 79; Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time, translated by Floyd V. 
Filson (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, nd.); 65. In God, Time, and Knowledge, William Hasker 
argues that the doctrine of divine timelessness is coherent; nevertheless, such a view requires that God‘s 
knowledge of temporal realities is a ―timeless representation‖ of them, which Hasker finds hard to accept. 
See God, Time, and Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, 169-170.  
 
5 
 
temporal succession.‖9  Similarly, Clark Pinnock retorts: 
The God of the Bible is not timeless. His eternity means that there has never been and never 
will be a time when God does not exist. Timelessness limits God. If he were timeless, God 
would be unable to work salvation in history, would be cut off from the world, have no real 
relationship with people and would be completely static.
10
 
 
 Thus this chapter seeks to examine the coherence of the eternalist view. I shall 
begin by examining the philosophical-theological bases for the doctrine of divine 
timelessness. This will be followed by a presentation of Paul Helm‘s defense of the 
classical medieval view. I shall then examine not only what Helm and the medieval 
theologians believed concerning divine timelessness but their justification for holding to 
the doctrine of divine timelessness. Finally, I shall assess the strengths and weaknesses of 
the divine timelessness view.  
 
Philosophical-Theological Bases for Divine Timelessness 
 
 Historically, the classical medieval view has been that God is timeless.
11
 
According to Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, the view that God is timelessly 
eternal entered into Christian thought because of influence of Greek philosophy. 
Concerning the development of the Greek concept of eternity, Stump and Kretzmann 
argue that the Greek notion of eternity ―would not be out of keeping with the tradition 
that runs though Parmenides, Plato, and Plotinus into Augustine, Boethius, and Aquinas . 
. .‖12  
                                                 
 
9
 Wolterstorff, 78.   
 
 
10
 Clark Pinnock, ―Systematic Theology,‖ in The Openness of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity 
Press, 1994), 121. 
 
 
11
 Augustine, Confessions, Book 11; Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, Book V: VI; 
Anselm, Monologium, Books XVIII-XXIV; and Anselm, Proslogium, Books XIII, XIX-XX; Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica, Question 10; and Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1: 15.  
 
 
12
 Stump and Kretzmann, 445. 
6 
 
 Whether a full-blown understanding of divine timelessness, as found in 
Augustine, Boethius, Anselm and Aquinas, existed among the earliest Christians is 
unclear; nevertheless, working from creation ex nihilo several of the Fathers understood 
God as both ―immutable‖ and ―eternal‖ and spoke of God as having ―no time,‖ because 
time, they claim, along with everything else, came into existence through the Creator. It 
is impossible for God to exist within time, for if God were in time, He would be bound by 
it, but it is impossible for God to be bound by anything.
13
 In what follows, I shall 
examine the four primary contributors to the Christian tradition that God is timeless: 
Augustine, Boethius, Anselm and Aquinas.  
 
Augustine of Hippo 
 
 For Augustine, time is a created thing along with the rest of creation, consisting of 
past, present and future. The present, for Augustine, is similar to a mathematical point, 
dividing the past from the future; but without duration.
14
 Unlike the present, the past is no 
more, while the future is not yet. Hence, the present is all that truly exists. He claims: 
―Who will see that all past time is driven back by the future, that all the future is 
consequent on the past, and all past and future are created and take their course from that 
which is ever present?‖15 Such a process is necessary, for, if there is no passage of time 
                                                 
 
13
 See Tatian, Address of Tatian to the Greeks, IV, V; Novatian, Treatise Concerning the Trinity, 
II; Ambrose, Exposition of the Christian Faith, B.1. 2:14, B.1. 9:61 
 
 
14
 Augustine, Confessions, 11: 15; Paul Helm, Faith and Understanding (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1997), 84. 
 
 
15
 Augustine, Confessions, 11: 14. 
 
7 
 
then the present would not be considered as time, but as eternity. Time, claims Augustine, 
―tends toward non-being.‖16   
 In contrast to creation, which is in such constant transience, an infinite being 
exists apart from time.  Augustine reasons, ―[a]t no time, therefore, did you do nothing, 
since you had made time itself. No times are coeternal with you, because you are 
permanent, whereas if they were permanent, they would not be times.‖ 17 God cannot be 
involved in the process of time that involves change; rather, an infinite being must be 
exempt from all change. For in eternity there is no ―passing away‖ but only ―the whole 
present.‖18 God‘s life exists all at once. There are no stages to His life. Reflecting on 
God‘s eternity Augustine explains: 
It is not in time that you precede time: elsewise you would not precede all times. You 
precede all past times in the sublimity of an ever present eternity, and you surpass all future 
times, because they are to come, and when they come, they shall be past, ‗but you are the 
Selfsame, and your years shall not fail‘….Your years are one day, and your day is not each 
day, but today, because with you today does not give way to tomorrow, nor does it succeed 
yesterday. With you, today is eternity….You have made all times, and you are before all 
times, and not at any time was there no time.
19
 
 
Because God created time, He cannot be part of or participate in it. An infinite being 
must transcend time while remaining untouched by the effects of time.  
 Throughout the Confessions it becomes clear that Augustine formulates his notion 
of God‘s timelessness from a basis in strong immutability. At one place he comments, 
―God‘s will belongs to his very substance. But if anything has appeared in God‘s 
                                                 
 
16
 Ibid. 
 
 
17
 Ibid. 
 
 
18
 Ibid., 11: 14 
 
 
19
 Ibid., 11: 13. 
 
8 
 
substance that previously was not there, then that substance is not truly called eternal.‖20 
What God has willed, He has eternally willed. In addition, an immutable and timeless 
God cannot grow in knowledge nor can He change in His ―activity.‖21   
 
Boethius 
 
 Boethius defines eternity as ―the complete, simultaneous and perfect possession 
of everlasting life.‖22 His distinction, between what does and does not make an object 
eternal, hinges on his understanding of the present. God‘s present is different than that of 
our own present in that God possesses His whole life at once whereas the creaturely 
present progresses through time. Even if the world is ―everlasting,‖ it is not considered 
eternal, because, it has parts and changes through time, losing yesterday and gaining 
tomorrow. According to Boethius, ―[i]n this life of today you do not live more fully than 
in that fleeting and transitory moment.‖23 What distinguishes God‘s infinite life from our 
own is the fullness that His life always possesses, i.e., a life without change, for better or 
for worse. Just as God‘s life exists with no change, so does His infinite knowledge. 
Boethius explains: 
His knowledge, too, transcends all temporal change and abides in the immediacy of His 
presence. It embraces all the infinite recesses of past and future and views them in the 
immediacy of its knowing as though they are happening in the present.…[a]nd if human and 
divine present may be compared, just as you see certain things in this your present time, so 
God sees all things in His eternal present ….the divine gaze looks down on all things without 
disturbing their nature, to Him they are present things, but under the condition of time they 
are future things.
24
 
                                                 
 
20
 Ibid., 11: 10.  
 
 
21
 Ibid., 11: 31.  
 
 
22
 Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, Book V: VI.  
 
 
23
 Ibid. 
 
 
24
 Ibid. 
 
9 
 
 
God sees the whole extent and infinite process of past and future events in His immediate 
present. There is nothing excluded from His knowledge. God does not discover or recall 
what will happen, but sees future events as the present, despite the fact that they have not 
yet occurred in our understanding of the temporal process. 
 
Anselm of Canterbury 
 
 According to Anselm, God is ―that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought.‖25 
Here, Anselm recognizes that God is already the greatest conceivable being. He cannot 
grow in greatness nor can He decrease in His being. Thus, this provides a theological 
reflective context for Anselm by which he can formulate a proper concept of God. From 
this, i.e., God is ―that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, Anselm concludes that 
God is both spaceless and timeless.  
 All that which is enclosed in any way by place or time is less than that which no law of place 
or time constrains. Since, then, nothing is greater than You, no place or time confines You 
but You exist everywhere and always. And because this can be said of You alone, You alone 
are unlimited and eternal.
26
  
 
If God had temporal or spatial location and extension, then He could not be the Supreme 
Being, for God would be confined. But God cannot be confined by anyone or anything. If 
God exists apart from any temporal or spatial location and extension, then God must be 
timeless. Anselm continues: 
 Indeed You exist neither yesterday nor today nor tomorrow but are absolutely 
outside all time. For yesterday and today and tomorrow are completely in time; 
however, You, though nothing can be without You, are nevertheless not in place or 
time but all things are in You. For nothing contains You, but you contain all things.
27
  
 
                                                 
 
25
 Anselm, Proslogium, 3.    
 
 
26
 Proslogium 13.   
 
 
27
 Proslogium 19.    
10 
 
In the Monologium, Anselm asserts that the Supreme Being ―exists either everywhere and 
always (i.e. in every place and time), or only somewhere and sometime (i.e. limited to 
some place and some time), or nowhere and never (i.e. in no place or time).‖28 As 
Anselm works out what it means for a Supreme Being to exist at every place and time, at 
first he concludes that God‘s existing at every place and time would be a contradiction. 
For such a being to exist in its entirety in every place and every time would mean that it 
consists of parts. However, because the ―Supreme Being‖ is ―supremely simple‖ and 
―supremely unchangeable,‖ then, it could not exist in parts.29  
But how can something exist as a whole simultaneously in individual times, unless those 
times are simultaneous? Suppose, on the other hand, that it exists as a whole in individual 
times severally and distinctly. . . In this case we should, properly, say that it was, is and will 
be. In which case its time-span is not simultaneously a whole. Rather it is stretched out in 
parts through the parts of time. But its time-span is its eternity and its eternity is precisely 
itself. The supreme essence, therefore, would be cut up into parts along the divisions of time. 
For if its life span is drawn out along the course of time, it must have, as time does, a 
present, past and future. But what is its life span, the duration of its existence, but its 
eternity?  So, since its eternity is nothing but its essence (as proved above), if its eternity has 
past, present, and future, then its essence also must have past, present, and future.
30
  
 
Whatever it means for God to be eternal, it is to be identified with His nature and His 
other attributes. Anselm believes that it is better for God to be one, i.e., unchangeable 
simplicity verses changeable parts. Therefore, Anselm concludes that the word ―always‖, 
when speaking of the divine substance, is nothing other than God‘s eternity, i.e. ―life 
unending, simultaneous, whole, and perfectly existing.‖31  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
28
 Monologium, 20. 
 
 
29
 Monologium, 21. 
 
 
30
 Ibid. 
 
 
31
 Monologium,  24.  
 
11 
 
Thomas Aquinas  
 
 ―Thus eternity is known from two sources,‖ says Aquinas, ―first, because what is 
eternal is interminable—that is, has no beginning nor end (that is, no term either way); 
secondly, because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole.‖32 For 
Aquinas, God‘s eternality is grounded in a strong immutability. If God is immutable, He 
is ―supremely immutable.‖33 He lists three arguments to support God‘s absolute 
changelessness. First, because God is the ―first being,‖ He must be pure act, i.e., He can 
have no potentiality. All potentiality, claims Aquinas, comes after an act. To say that God 
has potentiality would be to insist that He was not pure act.
34
 Secondly, Aquinas argues 
that anything which changes exists in part, and thus if God exists in part then He could 
not be ―altogether simple.‖35 God, as Spirit, does not have hands, feet, or any other body 
part. He is neither made up of material substance, nor can He be in time, since time is 
made up of parts; rather, He exists without composition. 
36
 Aquinas‘ third argument 
insists that anything that changes, changes either for the better or for the worst. Since 
God is infinite and perfect, He cannot change, for to do so would cause Him either to 
become greater than He is or to diminish in His greatness. 
37
  
                                                 
 
32
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica,  Part I of I, Q. 10, Art. 1. 
 
 
33
 Ibid., Part I of I, Q. 10, Art. 2. 
 
 
34
 Ibid. Part I of I, Q. 10, Art. 1. Aquinas provides a similar argument in Summa Contra Gentiles. 
He claims: ―The being whose substance has an admixture of potency is liable not to be by as much as it has 
potency; for that which can be, cannot not-be. But, God, being everlasting, in His substance cannot not-be.‖ 
Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1:16:2. 
 
 
35
 Ibid.  
 
 
36
 Ibid. In contrast to the Summa Theologica, where Aquinas begins with divine simplicity, the 
Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas‘ earlier work, places divine timelessness before divine simplicity. See 
Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1:18:2. 
 
 
37
 Ibid. 
12 
 
 If God‘s absolute timelessness follows from His absolute immutability, could 
there be any real relation between God and His creatures? Aquinas insists:  
Therefore, there is no real relation in God to His creature, whereas in creatures there is a real 
relation to God, because creatures are contained under the divine order, and their very nature 
entails dependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in the same nature. 
Hence no parallel exists.
38
 
 
This does not mean that God is impersonal, nor does it mean that He has no real relations; 
rather, God‘s relations are within God. Aquinas explains: ―the Father is denominated only 
from paternity, and the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity of filiation 
existed in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son, but only in our 
manner of understanding.‖39 If there were no real relations within God, then there would 
be no real distinction between the Father and the Son.  
  But the objection naturally arises, what of those instances in scripture when God 
is said to respond to His creatures, e.g. ―draw nigh to God and He will draw nigh to 
you‖?40 When scripture speaks in this way, Aquinas argues, it is speaking metaphorically, 
―[f]or as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out, according as its rays reach the 
house, so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx 
of His goodness, or decline from Him.‖41  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
38
 Ibid. Part I of I, Q. 28. Art. 1. 
 
 
39
 Ibid., Part I of I, Q. 28. Art. 2.  
 
 
40
 Ibid., Part I of I, Q. 9. Art. 1. Obj. 3. 
 
 
41
 Ibid.  
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Paul Helm’s Defense of the Classical Medieval View   
Of Divine Timelessness 
 
 
Justification for Divine Timelessness 
 
 Why think that God is timeless? According to Helm, eternalists rest their notion 
of divine timeless on a certain intuition of ―divine fullness.‖42 The everlasting view, 
claims Helm, is not unintelligible. We can conceive of God existing in time, yet, exist 
without growing older as we grow older. God‘s memory can remain intact. While this 
might mean that God is not simple, i.e., without parts, He nevertheless can remember all 
past events as vividly as when they occurred. But the problem that Helm has with the 
everlasting view is that, if God goes through a succession of events (from the past to the 
future), then it would seem that God has ―lost‖ the present.43 Helm claims: 
 Now suppose that God is in time in the sort of way that we are in time. It follows that he has 
a past, a present and a future. Perhaps (making the reasonable supposition that he has always 
existed) he has a past (p. 29) that is backwardly everlasting. There never was a time when 
God was not. It follows that there are segments of his life—those segments that existed 
before the present moment—which together constitute a part of God‘s life that is over and 
done with. And the eternalist will say that such an idea is incompatible with God‘s fullness 
and self-sufficiency.
44 
 
God could never regain the past, even if He could remember those events which occurred 
with perfect vividness.
45
 Such a view is incompatible with God‘s sovereignty, His 
perfection and His ―fullness of being.‖46  
                                                 
 
42
 Paul Helm, ―Divine Timeless Eternity.‖ In God and Time: Four Views, ed. Gregory Ganssle 
(Downers Gove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 29. 
 
 
43
 Helm, ―Divine Timeless Eternity‖ 30. 
 
44
 Ibid., 29-30. 
 
45
 Ibid. 
 
 
46
 Ibid., 31. 
 
14 
 
 The objection may arise: ―Does not scripture portray a portrait of a God who is 
everlasting and who acts in time.‖ Helm acknowledges that it is true that Scripture speaks 
of God ‗acting‘ within time, but, it is not at all clear that we should understand these 
statements of God‘s acting in time literally. Could not the language be anthropomorphic? 
After all, the authors of scripture employ such metaphorical language when they speak of 
God as having ‗wings‘ or ‗hands.‘ Helm suggests that Scripture does not clearly lean one 
way or another with regard to God‘s temporal mode of existence. When the Psalmist 
writes in Psalm 90:2, ―before the mountains were born, or Thou didst give birth to the 
earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou are God,‖ it could be that 
the writer used poetic license, extending the use of a hyperbole. Thus, it cannot be easily 
concluded that Scriptural language, which appears prima facie to speak of God in time, 
does so.
47
  
 In addition, Helm argues that it seems implausible to use strict scriptural terms for 
time and eternity as the absolute basis for forming any ―biblical‖ doctrine of God‘s 
relationship to time. Helm reasons that what should be important in forming our view of 
God‘s relationship to time is not so much a study of time words found in scripture; rather 
one should seek a ―reflective context‖ to formulate proper metaphysical and doctrinal 
concepts. Take for example, ―a geocentric view of the universe.‖48 Helm argues: 
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action.‖  See Harry Poe, ―The Problem of Time in Biblical Perspective,‖ in What God Knows: Time, 
Eternity, and Divine Knowledge, eds. Harry Lee Poe and J. Stanley (Waco: Baylor University, 2005), 10.  
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 Did the biblical writers accept or reject a geocentric view of the universe? If it can be shown 
that they rejected it, then, a geocentric account of the universe is inconsistent with what the 
biblical writers teach. If it can be shown that they accepted it, then it forms part of their 
teaching, or at least part of the background to their teaching. But if it can be shown that they 
neither accepted nor rejected it then we must conclude that with respect to whether or not the 
universe is geocentric their writings leave this an open issue.
49
 
 
He concludes by recognizing the shortage of such words found in the Scriptures and a 
lack of true definitions of ‗time‘ and ‗eternity‘. Nevertheless, while Scripture provides no 
such time words, it does, however, provide the ―raw data‖ necessary in formulating such 
a doctrine.
50
  
 Given that scripture provides a ―reflective context‖ for developing a doctrine of 
divine timelessness, Helm formulates his concept of God‘s eternality based on three 
primary sources: ―the data of Scripture coupled with a priori reflection on the ideas of the 
divine fullness and aseity and on the Creator-creature distinction‖ 51 and from certain 
conclusions implied by the cosmological arguments for the existence of God, i.e., ―from 
the fact of change to the existence of a Changeless One imply that it is impossible for the 
Changeless One to change.‖52  
 Consequently, the doctrine of divine immutability is again the basis for divine 
timelessness. By immutability, Helm means that God does not or could not change in any 
sense.
53
 According to Helm, ―a person is immutable if there is no respect in which he 
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 The term ‗immutability‘ is used differently by Christian theists. The word ‗strong‘ will be used 
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could really change,‖54 and ―[i]t is not that God is immutable because he is unwilling to 
change, but because his perfect nature is such that he need not and cannot change.‖55 
Immutability in the strong sense excludes even ―temporal or spatial ‗merely Cambridge‘ 
changes.‖56 But why must God be immutable in this strong sense? Rather than arguing 
that God is timeless because He is immutable, Helm proposes that divine timelessness 
secures God‘s immutability.57 For Helm, only a God who is immutable in the strong 
sense can perform those duties attributed to God by Scripture, but at the same time, only 
a God who is timeless secures a strong immutability. Helm provides four ways to 
understand God‘s immutability.  
 (a) God is immutable if in fact his character never changes. 
 (b) God is immutable if his character could not change. 
 (c) God is immutable if in fact nothing about him changes 
 (d) God is immutable if nothing about him could change.
58
 
  
He rejects both (a) and (b) because these two options leave open the possibility of 
persons other than God are immutable. He gives the example of an individual that might 
be ―uniformly brave‖ or ―stupid‖ or such a person that is ―incorrigible‖ could exhibit the 
same kind of immutability in (a) and (b) that is attributed to God. As far as (c) is 
concerned, such an understanding of immutability, if left open, could suggest that in a 
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possible world w’, that a certain immutable individual as (c) might not be immutable.  
Therefore, one is left with (d).
59
 Immutability in this sense means that God exists as 
―essential total changelessness.‖60 But if God is timelessly immutable, then how can He 
be involved with creation? 
 Like Augustine et al., Helm thinks the doctrine of timelessness is justified by 
drawing ―a proper distinction between the Creator and the creature.‖61 Instead of arguing 
from God‘s immutability to God‘s timelessness, Helm begins with asserting a difference 
between finite and infinite existence. His argument is as follows: 
 (1) Whatever is created is finite. 
 (2) Whatever is finite is mutable. 
 (3) Whatever is mutable is in time. Therefore, 
 (4) Whatever is created is in time. 
   And 
 (5) Whatever is the creator is infinite. 
 (6) Whatever is infinite is immutable. 
 (7) Whatever is immutable is outside time. Therefore, 
 (8) Whatever is the creator is outside time. 62  
 
Helm believes that premises (1) and (5) are based on two principles found in Scripture. 
The first principle is that God, as creator, has been understood in Christian theology as an 
―infinite spirit.‖ 63  Secondly, all of creation came into existence ex nihilo, i.e. out of 
nothing. God as ―infinite spirit‖ creates all things and as created are other than God.  A 
finite creator would be dependent on something for its existence and a creation out of 
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pre-existing material would imply that either something exists co-eternally with God or 
that God could not be the creator of everything that is.  
 
Divine Timelessness and Divine Act 
 If God is timelessly eternal and strongly immutable, could such a being act within 
time and directly care for His creation? Helm‘s answer is ―no.‖ God does not directly act 
within time, for God‘s acting within time in response to His creatures would mean that 
God is temporal.  
 A timeless being may not act within the universe, yet it makes sense to say that such 
a being produces (tenseless) the universe. The production of the universe is thus not 
the production of some event or complex of events in time; it is the production of the 
whole material universe, time included.
64
   
 
What Helm is saying here is that God‘s producing the universe is in actuality God‘s 
producing the entire space-time universe through one eternal act, including all its 
scattered temporal events.  God‘s producing and sustaining of the universe is grounded in 
God‘s unchanging will. But Helm is quick to point out that God‘s willing a change is not 
the same as changing a will. For if God were to change His will then He would not be 
immutable.
65
 But how are we to think of God‘s willing different effects within the 
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universe? Could God‘s willing different effects within the space-time universe even be 
possible? Helm believes so:   
The correct way to think of God‘s eternally willing something in time is to think of one 
eternal act of will with numerous temporally scattered effects. As an analogy, we may think 
of a person‘s action in setting the timer for her central heating system. This is (we may 
suppose) one action, analogous to God‘s eternal willing. But this one action has numerous 
temporally scattered effects, analogous to the effects in time of God‘s one eternal act of 
willing; as a result of the one act, the system fires at 7:00 a.m., goes off at 12:00 noon, fires 
again at 2:00p.m., goes off again at 10:30 p.m. day after day. The basic point is: there can be 
one decision to bring about different effects at different times. This decision may be in time, 
as in our example, but it may also be timeless. Aquinas put the point well: ‗Note that to 
change your will is one matter, and to will a change in some thing is another. While 
remaining constant, a person can will this to happen now and the contrary to happen 
afterwards. His will, however, would change were he to begin to will what he had not willed 
before, or cease to will what he had willed before.‘66  
 
Thus God does not perform individual acts in response to His creatures. It is better to 
think of God‘s intentions and His responses to His creatures as somehow ―built in‖ to the 
temporal order.
67
 Helm explains: 
 . . . it is consistent to suppose that not only can a timelessly eternal God will things in time 
without changing his will; he may also eternally will his own reactions in time to some 
human action. Suppose that God eternally knows that I will perform some particular action. 
Knowing this, he eternally decrees to bring about some action in the world as a response to 
my action. Thus God may eternally will both the burning bush and his temporally 
subsequent utterances to Moses, eternally knowing that Moses‘ attention will be attracted by 
the burning bush. These are logically distinct elements, but not temporally distinct elements, 
of God‘s one eternal decree.
68
   
 
The objection could be raised: ―If God‘s will is eternal and unchanging, then God could 
never decide to create anything.‖ For instance, John Feinberg raises the following  
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objection: 
 Suppose we conclude that, as omniscient, God does not deliberate. Suppose we add that God 
has always known everything, so he has always known exactly what he and anyone else 
would do. If so, then it seems that neither now nor ever in God‘s life has he deliberated or 
even decided what he would. He hasn‘t needed to do so, because he has always known what 
would happen. But if this is so…how can we square the idea that God has never deliberated 
and made a decision with biblical passages that speak of God doing all things according to 
the counsel of His will (e.g., Eph. 1:11)?
69
  
 
The problem with this kind of argument, claims Helm, is how we ought to define 
―choice‖ or ―decision.‖ When we think of choice, we often think in terms of temporal 
causality. But why must all choices be temporal and causal affairs? Helm believes that 
creation can be a contingent choice and yet, an eternal and unchanging choice. God‘s 
choice to create was not a choice in time; rather, it was a logical or conceptual choice. All 
that is necessary for God to have a choice is an alternative to His choice, the power to 
will His choice, and a reason to will that choice over the alternatives. According to Helm, 
God‘s deciding to create A consists of an eternal contemplation of alternative possibilities 
and an eternal rejection of those other possibilities.
70 
  
 
Divine Timelessness and Omniscience 
 
 Given that God is timelessly eternal and strongly immutable; could such a being 
be omniscient?
71
 There have been two basic objections raised against the compatibility of 
                                                 
 
69
 Feinberg, No One Like Him, 313. 
 
 
70
 Helm, Eternal God, 178. 
  
 
71
 Minimally, divine omniscience means that God knows everything. Omniscience has also been 
taken to mean that God knows: 
 (1) all true propositions 
 (2) true propositions and the truth and falsity of all true propositions 
 (3) everything that can be known 
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divine timelessness and omniscience. The first objection states that an omniscient God, if 
He is timeless and immutable, could not know what is happening in the world. If God is 
unaware of what is taking place in the world, then, God is not omniscient. On the other 
hand, if God is omniscient, knowing what is ―now‖ taking place in the world, He could 
not be immutable. 72 Consider the following propositions: 
 (1) A perfect being is not subject to change 
 (2) A perfect being knows everything 
 (3) A being that knows everything always knows what time it is. 
 (4) A being that always knows what time it is subject to change 
 (5) Therefore a perfect being is subject to change 
 (6) Therefore a perfect being is not a perfect being 
 (7) There is no perfect being
73
 
 
It seems that a strongly immutable and timeless God could not know ―now‖ what is going 
on in the universe.
74
 We can think of God existing timelessly, tenselessly knowing that 
there exists a universe which unfolds, and in such a way that it includes a succession of 
events. He knows that on September 11, 2001, a plane crashes into the World Trade 
Center. He also knows that Smith worries at 10:00 A.M. EST, September 11, 2001, 
because his relative works on the thirtieth floor of the World Trade Center. We can also 
say that God knows tenselessly that on November 6, 2012 the first woman is elected 
president of the United States. Again, God knows that at 1:33 P.M. EST on May 2, 2008, 
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Ronnie sips on a cup of coffee. Each event occurs at different times. As temporal beings, 
we can see a temporal succession of past, present and future. We know that the World 
Trade Center attack was a past event, while as the election of 2012 is yet a future event. 
Furthermore, Ronnie sipping his coffee is an event that is ―now‖ taking place, and, by our 
understanding, it is present. We also know that, if one accepts an A theory of time, the 
past is no more and that future has not yet come into existence.
 75
 A timeless being cannot 
make such distinctions as past, present and future, i.e., at least in the same way that we 
can make those distinctions. A timeless being could know logically that Event e’ comes 
before Event e‘‘ and that Event e’’’ comes after both e’ and e’’.76 However, it does not 
seem that a timeless God could know tensed facts as such.  
 Helm offers two responses to the above objection. First, for every ―temporal-
indexical equivalent,‖ says Helm, a timeless person could know equivalent ―non-
indexical expressions.‖77 Helm explains: 
 One response—if it may be called that—is simply to concede the point and give up strict 
omniscience. One might concede the strict point of metaphysics but claim that God may 
nevertheless know sufficiently to enable him infallibly to deduce the occurrence of all true 
indexical expressions about time, expressions using words such as now, then, yesterday, 
tomorrow. The occurrences of such expressions in utterances are, after all, events that God, 
in virtue of his vast knowledge, must know. He does not know that 1999 is now for him, 
because it isn‘t. But he knows all the times when each of us make true utterances such as ―It 
is now . . .‖ and he knows that whenever in 1999 we say ―It is now 1999‖ we are speaking 
the truth. So God can know that ―It is now 1999‖ is true for us whenever in that year it is 
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uttered, and he knows when it is uttered, for he knows that it is uttered at some particular 
time during 1999.
78
  
 
Take the following propositions:  
 (1) It is raining on 30 July 1987. 
 (2) Someone living on 30 July 1987 can, and does, utter the true expression ‗It is    
 raining now‘.79 
 
Obviously, if God is timeless, then He could not know that ―it is now raining‖; 
nevertheless, given that an omniscient being knows all facts, he can come to know 
indirectly that ―it is now raining‖ based on His knowledge that ―it rains on 30 July 1987‖ 
and that someone living on 30 July 1987 utters ―it is now raining.‖  
 The second response Helm provides to the above objection is that the temporalist 
suffers from the same problem as the eternalist, i.e., that there are some propositions that 
a temporal God cannot know.  
 . . . one may point out that . . . the temporalist is in a parallel position with respect to the 
issue. For if God is in time, then there are also types of propositions that such a temporal 
God cannot know—propositions that express knowledge of the universe from the 
perspective of timeless eternity.
80
 
 
Temporality and atemporality, says Helm, are restricted positions. A temporal being 
cannot know what it is like to exist outside of time. Similarly, Helm argues that an 
omniscient being could not know what it is like to share the ―me-ness‖ of another person. 
Each person, says Helm, has his or her own ―me-ness.‖ Only an individual can 
experience individual ―me-ness.‖ Only Smith can know that ―I, Smith, am talking on the 
phone.‖ Jones can know that Smith is talking on the phone, but Jones cannot know in the 
same way that Smith knows he is talking on the phone. There is only a certain ―me-ness‖ 
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that Smith can know apart from anyone else knowing it. Just as Jones cannot know 
Smith‘s ―me-ness‖, neither could God know Jones‘ or Smith‘s or any other person‘s ―me-
ness.‖ An individual‘s ―me-ness‖ is a restricted position that only that person shares with 
himself. Thus, if God is temporal then there are propositions that a temporal, omniscient 
God cannot know.
81
  
 The second objection brought against the compatibility of divine timelessness and 
omniscience is based on God‘s omniscience of the future and human libertarian freewill.  
Several philosophers have suggested that, given human libertarian freewill,
82
 an 
omniscient God could not know future contingents.
83
 Richard Swinburne argues that 
since God can know only true propositions, He could not know future propositions 
concerning the free actions of human beings, because these propositions are neither true 
nor false. Future propositions performed by free agents become true only when the free 
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agent has performed the action.
84
 Further, Swinburne maintains that God limits His own 
knowledge of the future to preserve both His freedom and creaturely freedom. 
 In choosing to preserve his own freedom (and to give others freedom), he (that is, God) 
limits his own knowledge of what is to come. He continually limits himself in this way by 
not curtailing his or men‘s future freedom. As regards men, their choices are much 
influenced by circumstances and this makes it possible for a being who knows all the 
circumstances to predict human behavior correctly most of the time, but always with the 
possibility that men may falsify those predictions.
85
 
 
According to Helm, the above position limits God, not only in His omniscience, but also 
in His omnipotence. If God is omniscient in the sense that Swinburne and Open Theism 
proposes, then it seems that God will have plans that are thwarted or that He will not be 
able to accomplish all that He sets out to accomplish. Helm agrees that if humans are 
indeterministically free, then God could not know the future of truly free (in the 
libertarian‘s sense) creatures. However, if God is omniscient in the way promoted by 
Swinburne and Openness Theism, then there is a tradeoff: 
 There will, in the life of God, necessarily be some frustration as those ends that he wishes to 
secure cannot be achieved, or must be achieved by a different route. God will have many 
true beliefs about the future; he will be highly informed and expert, but his knowledge will 
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An objector may argue that, because God knows what happens in the future, one must accept fate. This 
argument, however, is a non sequitur, because there is a distinction between what ―will‖ happen and what 
―must‖ happen. See Craig, The Only, 55-57.  
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be like your knowledge and mine – it will be fallible. Alternatively, infallibility will be 
purchased at the expense of ignorance.
86
 
 
While the Swinburnian and Openness view allow for indeterministically free creatures, it 
debilitates God‘s sovereignty and omnipotence. Thus, for Helm, a strong omnipotence 
―entails‖ and ―requires‖ a strong omniscience,87 and only a timeless and strongly 
immutable God could preserve a strong omniscience.
88
    
 Helm recognizes that Swinburne‘s notion of omniscience finds support in 
scripture. For instance, there are places in scripture which indicate that God changes His 
plans or actions in response to human intercession or repentance. Seemingly then: 
 . . . there are, in effect, two types of scriptural data. One type indicates that God‘s knowledge 
is unqualified. The other type of data represents God as learning, as forgetting, as changing 
his mind, as being surprised, and the like. What, then, ought we to conclude? What part do 
such data play in an account of divine providence which is not only coherent in itself but in 
accordance with all the data of Scripture?
89
 
  
How is it that scripture presents two, seemingly contradictory, portraits of God‘s 
knowledge? The answer to this apparent contradiction is found in John Calvin‘s notion of 
―accommodation.‖ But before moving on to Helm‘s use of accommodation, it would be 
beneficial to examine two hermeneutical approaches to the seemingly contradictory 
scriptural data.  
 There are two ways to approach the data of scripture, says Helm. First, one could 
interpret the language of scripture in such a way that those passages which speak of 
God‘s ―ignorance‖ or ―powerlessness‖ take precedent over those passages which speak of 
God‘s omniscience or power. Instead, when the Bible speaks of God‘s omniscience and 
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power, these statements should be taken hyperbolically. The alternative ―hermeneutical 
position‖ is to interpret the statements which speak of God as limited, e.g., as in ignorant 
or changing His mind, in light those passages which speak of God as immutable or 
maximal in His knowledge and power. Helm concludes that this later method should take 
precedent and that any statements which are anthropomorphic or in the ―weaker sense‖ 
should be interpreted by those statements which exhibit the ―extent and intensity of 
God‘s knowledge, power, and goodness.‖90   
 Now by accommodation, Helm means ―the need for God to address men and 
women in terms that they can understand and respond to.‖91 Scripture‘s uses of 
anthropomorphisms is not a humanly attempt to speak of the ―inexpressible‖; rather, it is 
―one of the ways in which God graciously condescends to his creatures.‖ 92 Thus for 
Calvin, says Helm, not only is scripture‘s use the anthropomorphisms and such language 
―an act of accommodation‖ but it is also ―an act of grace.‖93 Therefore, scripture portrays 
God: 
 . . . in anthropomorphic ways, and his action and character are also likened to non-human 
animals and to inanimate things. The reason for such portrayals is both pragmatic and 
logical: the need to represent God to human beings in ways which do not (as Calvin would 
have put it) pander to the natural, sinful torpor and sluggishness of the human mind; and also 
the need for God to reveal himself in such a way as to make dialogue possible between 
himself and his human creatures.
94
 
 
Thus, it is necessary for believers to adopt a hermeneutical approach to scripture where it 
recognizes anthropomorphic language for what it is and from there interpret such 
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language in view of those passages and scriptural data which speak of God in His 
maximal qualities.    
 
Conclusion 
 
 Is Helm‘s defense of the classical medieval notion of divine timelessness 
coherent? Moreover, do the doctrines of divine timelessness and strong immutability 
cohere with other core doctrines of the Christian faith? For now, we shall only examine 
the eternalist argument from divine fullness. Chapter two will pick up on our discussion 
of strong immutability. Further, chapter two will consider two objections to divine 
timeless and strong immutability based on the doctrines of creation and incarnation.   
 Much of Helm‘s discussion on divine timelessness depends on two key concepts: 
the intuition of divine fullness and a strong immutability. There are two reasons 
eternalists hold to the notion of divine fullness. First, it preserves the Judeo-Christian 
teaching that God is a transcendent and free being. He is uncreated and has always 
existed. God does not depend on anything for His existence, nor is He imposed on by 
anything outside of Himself. Rather, everything that exists depends on Him for its 
existence. Second, divine fullness preserves God‘s perfection. All theists believe that God 
is a perfect being. But in contrast to the Process view, which holds that the divine being 
can surpass Himself,
95
 the doctrine of divine fullness teaches that God does not increase 
or decrease in His perfection, since He is already perfect. Despite the fact that divine 
fullness preserves God‘s transcendence and perfection, is there reason to reject such a 
notion? In what follows, two possible objections to the notion of divine fullness will be 
considered. 
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 One possible objection to divine fullness is that, despite the fact God looses the 
past and that it is no longer present to Him, there is no reason to doubt that time exists for 
God. Nicholas Wolterstorff asserts that there is a  
 . . . feeling, deep-seated in much of human culture, that the flowing of events into an 
irrecoverable and unchangeable past is a matter for deep regret. Our bright actions and 
shining moments do not long endure. The gnawing tooth of time bites all. And our evil deeds 
can never be undone….Of course, the philosopher is inclined to distinguish the mere fact of 
temporality from the actual pattern of the events in history and to argue that regrets about the 
latter should not slosh over into regrets about the former. The philosopher is right. The 
regrettableness of what transpires in time is not good ground for regretting that there is a 
time….Regrets over the pervasive pattern of what transpires within time have led whole 
societies to place the divine outside of time –freed from the ―bondage‖ of temporality.96  
 
But the eternalist may not be satisfied with Wolterstorff‘s response.  
 A second objection to the notion of divine fullness is to argue that God has perfect 
recall of all past experiences. God is not a temporal being in the same way that we are 
temporal. Our humanly knowledge is limited by our temporal-spatial world and often we 
forget the past. Unlike our human memory, God knows things as perfectly and vividly as 
they occurred, thus dulling ―time‘s tooth.‖97 William Lane Craig explains: 
 When we recall that God is perfectly omniscient and so forgets absolutely nothing of the past 
and knows everything about the future, then time‘s tooth  is considerably dulled for Him. His 
past experiences do not fade as ours do, and He has perfect recall of what He has undergone. 
To be sure, the past itself is gone (given a tensed or dynamic view of time0, but His 
experience of the past remains as vivid as ever.
98
   
 
However, Helm finds this kind of objection inadequate.  
 Let us suppose that God‘s recall is sharp and vivid and total – beyond anything that we 
experience in our rememberings. The main thing is that though God may infallibly and 
vividly remember his past, those bits of his life that he remembers are over. One cannot, by 
definition, remember what is not past; and what is past is not present. God may ―relive‖ 
them through memory, but he cannot, literally, live them again. Nor would a divine 
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analogue of time travel be of any more help, for the reason already given. The uniqueness 
of the present moment is forever lost when the moment becomes past.
99
  
 
 Despite the above objections, the argument from divine fullness seems to be a 
strong argument in favor of divine timelessness. Nevertheless, in order for God to have 
the whole existence at once, as the argument from divine fullness proposes, then God 
would need to be strongly immutable.
 100
 For now, we must judge that Helm‘s view of 
divine timelessness is coherent; however, the doctrine of divine timelessness ultimately 
depends on a strong immutability. In what follows, we shall examine the doctrine of 
divine immutability. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
DIVINE IMMUTABILITY, CREATION AND INCARNATION 
 
 As was previously demonstrated, strong immutability and timelessness entail one 
another. Eternalists understand immutability in the strongest sense. Not only is God 
changeless, it is not even possible for Him to change. But does such an understanding 
come from scripture‘s teaching on the doctrine? In this chapter, we seek to examine the 
doctrine of immutability in light of scripture and by examining some modern treatments 
of the doctrine. What will be shown is that, while scripture affirms the doctrine of 
immutability, the interpretation of immutability by eternalism should be rejected. Instead, 
the Bible teaches that God is immutable in the sense that He does not change in His 
essence, character, plan or purposes. Further, given a modified interpretation of the 
doctrine of immutability, two objections will be raised against the doctrine of divine 
timelessness. The first objection will examine the doctrine of creation. If God creates and 
sustains the temporal universe, then it would seem that God is temporal. But as will be 
demonstrated, this objection depends on one‘s view of the nature of time. If one holds to 
the B-theory of time, then the doctrines of timelessness and immutability are preserved. 
However, if the A-theory of time is true, then it would seem that God is somehow 
temporal by virtue of His sustaining creation. The second objection that will be raised 
examines the incarnation. The traditional Christian doctrine of the incarnation, i.e., that 
God the Son assumed flesh and dwelt among us, seemingly contradicts the notion that 
God is timelessly eternal. If Christ entered into our space-time realm, then it would seem 
32 
 
that in order for Him to do such an act as become incarnate, He would need to be in some 
sense temporal.  
 
The Doctrine of Immutability 
 The doctrine of divine immutability has come under recent attack by Process 
theology and by proponents of the Openness of God. Both Process theologians and 
Openness proponents have taken classical theology‘s view of immutability to mean that 
God is a static being. Concerning the classical conception of immutability, John Cobb 
and David Ray Griffin claim: 
 The concept derives from the Greeks, who maintained that ―perfection‖ entailed compete 
―immutability,‖ or lack of change. The notion of ―impassability‖ stressed that deity may be 
completely unaffected by any other reality and must lack all passion or emotional response. 
The notion that deity is the ―Absolute‖ has meant that God is not really related to the world. 
The world is really related to God, in that the relation to God is constitutive of the world—an 
adequate description of the world requires reference to its dependence on God—but even the 
fact that there is a world is not constitutive of the reality of God. God is wholly independent 
of the world: the God-world relation is purely external to God. These three terms—
unchangeable, passionless, and absolute—finally say the same thing, that the world 
contributes nothing to God, and that God‘s influence upon the world is in no way 
conditioned by divine responsiveness to unforeseen, self-determining activities of us worldly 
beings. Process theology denies the existence of this God.
1
   
 
Similarly Clark Pinnock states that, 
 . . . . the tradition has taken immutability far in the direction of immobility and inertness. 
Some have claimed that God is wholly actual and not at all potential and thus cannot change 
in any way. They have equated the biblical idea of faithfulness with the Greek idea that 
requires any changes related to God to occur only on the human side.
2
      
 
Despite the above objections, how should the Christian theist construe the doctrine of 
divine immutability? Should Christian theism accept the notion of strong immutability 
found in eternalism or should the doctrine of immutability be rejected altogether? Below 
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we shall examine the biblical basis for the doctrine of divine immutability, followed by a 
re-examination of the doctrine.   
 
Biblical Basis for Divine Immutability     
 While the word immutability never appears in scripture, the concept, nevertheless, 
is implied by many verses. Scripture teaches that God does not change in His divine 
nature and character. In Psalm 102:25-27, the psalmist declares ―Of old You founded the 
earth, And the heavens are the work of Your hands. Even they will perish, but You 
endure; And all of them will wear out like a garment; Like clothing You will change 
them and they will be changed. ‗But You are the same, And Your years will not come to 
an end.‘‖ Here the psalmist affirms that while all that God has created will change, yet He 
will ―endure.‖ His existence is forever. Further, Scripture confirms that God does not 
change in certain attributes, e.g., His loving kindness (Ps 103:17) and power (Rom 1:20).  
Similarly, when contrasting our corruptness with God‘s incorruptibility, James reminds 
His readers that ―Every good thing given and every perfect gift is from above, coming 
down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no variation or shifting shadow‖ 
(James 1:17). God is neither fickle, as we are, nor can He become something He is not. 
The prophet Malachi records, ―For I, the LORD, do not change; therefore you, O sons of 
Jacob, are not consumed‖ (Mal 3:6). In 1 John 1:5, the apostle claims that ―God is Light, 
and in Him there is no darkness.‖ God is perfectly holy. He cannot cease being so. 
Further, Paul reminds Timothy that, even when we are ―faithless,‖ God ―remains faithful, 
for He cannot deny Himself‖ (2 Tim 2:13). Along the lines of God‘s faithfulness, God 
always fulfills His promises (2 Cor 1:20).  
34 
 
 Scripture also affirms that God does not change in His divine plan or will. For 
instance, we read in Ps 33:11 that ―The counsel of the LORD stands forever, The plans of 
His heart from generation to generation‖ (See also Prov 19:21). Similarly, God does not 
change in His purposes (Isa 14:24; 46:9-10; Heb 6:17).    
 Thus from the above passages it is clear that scripture affirms God‘s immutability. 
God is immutable in His divine nature and attributes as well as in character. In addition, 
God‘s life is such that it endures and is incorruptible. Further, God does not change in His 
divine plan, decree or purposes. Now that we have observed the scriptural basis, let us re-
examine the doctrine of immutability in light of some recent theological formulations of 
the doctrine.  
 
A Re-examination of the Doctrine of Divine Immutability 
 As was demonstrated earlier, for eternalism, the doctrine of strong immutability is 
intricately linked to the doctrine of divine timelessness. Paul Helm asserts that there is:  
. . . . a conceptual connection between divine immutability and divine eternity in that an 
individual who is immutable in the strong sense must be eternal, and vice versa. It follows in 
turn that divine timeless eternity is the conceptual link between immutability (in the strong 
sense) and omniscience. Only a timeless God can be both strongly immutable and 
omniscient.
3
 
 
If T stands for ―timeless‖ and S for ―strongly immutable,‖ then we can state the eternalist 
proposition in the following way: 
 (x) (Tx      Sx); def. For any x, if x is T, then x is S 
 
Following Augustine et al., Helm proposes that only a God immutable in the strongest  
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sense could perform those acts attributed to Him by scripture. Nothing about God 
changes or could change. Such a Being could not even experience Cambridge changes.
4
   
 Part of the motivation for the doctrine of strong immutability, as found in 
eternalism, is God‘s perfection. This is particularly recognized in Helm‘s treatment of 
divine fullness. There is an underlying assumption that all change is either for the better 
or worse. God is both necessary and the greatest being. If God is already the greatest 
being then how can he change for the better? Otherwise He would become more and 
more perfect.  But God cannot grow in perfection: He is already perfect. If God changes 
for the worse, then He would no longer be God, since such a change would imply that 
God is no longer perfect. Hence for eternalism any change would be a change in value. 
But as Thomas Morris points out: 
. . . . why think that all possible changes are changes of value? Can‘t there be value-neutral 
changes? As I write this sentence I change from forming one letter to forming the next, but I 
see no reason to think that such changes necessitate an increase or a decrease in my intrinsic 
value or metaphysical stature at all. And if there are value-neutral changes, it will not follow 
from the fact that God cannot change for the better or for the worse that God cannot change 
at all. So his perfection does not clearly motivate a doctrine of absolute immutability after 
all.
5
 
 
 Is there reason to think that God changes in a ―value-neutral‖ sense? In order to answer 
this question, it will help to clarify the biblical doctrine of immutability by examining 
different ways Christian theists construe the doctrine. Here Richard Swinburne, Jay 
Richards and Bruce Ware provide helpful insight with regard to the doctrine of 
immutability.    
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Richard Swinburne 
 Richard Swinburne distinguishes between a ―weak‖ and ―strong‖ sense of 
immutability. According to Swinburne,  
 [i]n the weaker way to say of a person that he is immutable is simply to say that he cannot 
change in character. To say of a free and omniscient creator that he is immutable is simply to 
say that, while he continues to exist, necessarily he remains fixed in his character. . . . 
According to traditional theism God is essentially perfectly free and omniscient, and so it 
follows that he will not change in character.
6
  
  
The stronger way of speaking about immutability implies that God ―cannot change at 
all.‖7 Swinburne rejects the stronger sense of immutability, because such a notion means 
that ―from all eternity‖ God‘s intentions are fixed. God would be a ―lifeless thing; not a 
person who reacts to men with sympathy or anger, pardon or chastening because he 
chooses to there and then.‖8 Swinburne‘s contribution has helped pinpoint different ways 
in which the doctrine of immutability can be interpreted. But if we are to accept the 
weaker sense only, as Swinburne does, then we are recognizing that God is immutable in 
His character, only. Scripture affirms that God is immutable in His character, but it also 
affirms that God is immutable in His nature and attributes, purposes, plan and decree. 
Thus merely distinguishing between a ―weaker‖ and ―stronger‖ sense of immutability is 
not enough.   
 
Jay Richards 
 Jay Richards also sets forth a re-examination of the doctrine of divine 
immutability in view of what he calls ―theological essentialism,‖ which employs the use 
of modal logic and possible worlds. By ―essentialism‖ Richards means: ―the thesis that 
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persons, objects and entities have some of their properties necessarily or essentially, and 
others accidentally or contingently.‖9 Now when speaking of ―properties,‖ Richards has 
in mind ―states of affairs concerning entities of different types: as truths or facts about 
such entities.‖10 Thus, theological essentialism is the conception that God has certain 
properties essentially and contingently. 
 In Richards‘ view, God‘s having contingent properties entails ―all those properties 
that include contingent states of affairs, such as those concerned with creation.‖11 This 
also includes God‘s relations to creation. For example, God’s sustaining the universe or 
God’s hearing Smith’s prayers are contingent states of affairs. It could have been the case 
that God created a different world in which different states of affairs obtained or that God 
ceased from creating any world. Contingent properties are not essential for God to have 
and would not have obtained in every possible world. Nevertheless, the contingency of 
the world and God‘s relations to it are grounded in God‘s perfect freedom.  
 On the other hand, essential properties are those properties that God exhibits in 
every possible world. Among essential properties are God‘s perfections, which belong to 
God‘s essence. Since God exists necessarily in every possible world, then so, too, do 
God‘s perfections. Yet, no contingent properties belong to God‘s essence, ―since an 
essence is a set of all essential properties or at least includes that set.‖12  
 But how does theological essentialism translate into our discussion on divine 
immutability? According to Richards, ―we can consider the possibilities that God is 
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immutable in every respect, in some respects or in no respect.‖13 If we take seriously 
Scripture‘s testimony of the doctrine of divine immutability, then the last option should 
be rejected. But how should one take God‘s immutability in ―every respect‖? Richards 
finds this understanding of immutability implausible. For instance, when taking into 
consideration such Christian doctrines as creation and the incarnation, there remains an 
element of contingency in both of these doctrines. It would seem that both God’s creating 
the world and God the Son’s becoming incarnate are non-essential properties to God.14 
While both are important to God and ought not to be considered trivial, they are, 
nevertheless, contingent. For God, in His perfect freedom, did not have to create, nor 
through the Son, become incarnate; rather they result from God‘s free choice to create 
and to become incarnate.  
 To say that God has contingent properties is to say that God changes, at least in 
respect to His now having a property that He did not have before, e.g., the relation of now 
sustaining the universe. Again, having this property does not imply that God changes in 
His essence. In addition to God‘s having contingent properties, there seems to be 
variations in God‘s knowledge. 
 Think, for example of some variations in knowledge. For instance, while it is better for God 
to know everything that he can know than to lack some knowledge relevant to his purview, 
is it better to know the truth that (1) John Brown runs at t than that (2) John Brown does not 
run at t? It is hard to see how. What is important is to know which of these propositions is 
true, rather than to believe one falsely. And if (1) is true in some possible worlds and (2) is 
true in others, it would hardly be a deficiency for God‘s knowledge to change depending on 
which state of affairs obtains. In fact, the truth is just the opposite. It is surely better to know 
what is the case than to be immune to change in knowledge. So every type of change does 
not violate the PP [Principal of Perfection].
15
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God‘s having variations in His knowledge does not entail a deficiency in perfection; 
rather, as Richards points out, it is better for God to know what ―is the case,‖ than for 
God to experience no change in His knowledge. That God has these contingent properties 
stems from God‘s freedom. Richards explains: 
 The fact that some of God‘s properties may vary seems to follow straightforwardly from the 
fact that God exercises libertarian freedom in choosing to create the world. If God had to 
create the world, then God‘s creative activity was not free. In contrast, recognizing that God 
could have done otherwise captures the fact that God was free in creating, the graciousness 
of his choice to do so and the contingency of the world he has created.
16
  
 
Richards thinks that it would be an error ―to deny that choice was an element of God‘s 
creative freedom.‖17 
 This leaves Richards, then, with the last option, i.e., that God is immutable in 
―some respect.‖ Richards rejects the notion that God is immutable in His character and 
faithfulness only. Theologians and philosophers, says Richards, appeal to this 
understanding of immutability based on the text of Scripture. However, such a conception 
of divine immutability seems inadequate, if left by itself. Richards argues: 
 If God is perfect, then surely God is essentially reliable and steadfast, since it is surely better 
to be reliable and steadfast in all possible worlds than in only some. So grounding God‘s 
reliability and unchangeableness in his essence makes sense. . . . Moreover, why restrict 
God‘s immutability only to his character, that is, to his moral qualities? After all, 
commitment to divine perfection and aseity seem to require immutability (i.e., essentiality) 
of God‘s other perfections as well. If God‘s essence could change (ignoring for the moment 
the fact that this would render his essence nonessential), then obviously enough, it could be 
possible that he lack some or all of his essential properties, including his perfections. But 
then God might lack a perfection p, which would obviously be worse than if he possessed 
perfection p essentially. So whatever perfection God does in fact possess, such as 
omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, freedom and faithfulness, he must possess 
immutably. That is, if God is perfect with respect to his positive attributes, then he is 
immutable with respect to those attributes. God has certain essential properties by virtue of 
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being perfect; so he cannot change in those respects. This much is not only compatible with 
but also entailed by an essentialism committed to central Christian themes.
18
   
  
 Not only is God‘s essence immutable, says Richards, but it is God‘s immutability that 
―distinguishes God‘s essential properties from his accidental ones.‖19 So, rather than 
rejecting immutability, the essentialist only rejects the claim that God can change in no 
sense.  
 Richards has contributed to our discussion on the doctrine of divine immutability 
by distinguishing between God‘s essential and accidental properties.20 As Richards 
rightly acknowledges, if there is a distinction between God‘s essential and accidental 
properties, then no accidental properties could properly be said to be part of God‘s 
essence. Rather, only those properties, e.g., His divine perfections, are essential to God 
and thus belong to God‘s unchanging essence, that is, God would have these essential 
properties in every possible world. Accidental properties, on the other hand, such as 
God’s creating the world, are contingent and depend on God‘s unchanging essence. But 
how are we to construe these accidental properties in view of God‘s own self-disclosure? 
What follows will help to elucidate the kinds of changes that could be said of God.  
 
Bruce Ware 
 Bruce Ware furthers our attempt to distinguish between senses of God‘s 
immutability. According to Ware, the notion of ―absolute immutability‖ should be 
rejected, since such a view ―not only violates . . . .valid senses to conceive of God‘s 
ability to change, but it also blurs certain distinctions that are called for by Scripture in 
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relation to his ability to change.‖21 Ware distinguishes between God‘s ―ontological 
immutability‖ and God‘s ―ethical immutability.‖ 22 First, by ontologically immutable, 
Ware means that God does not change ―in the supreme excellence of his intrinsic nature‖, 
i.e., He is ―constant‖ in His revealed ―self-sameness.‖23 God‘s ontological immutability is 
a ―first-order conception‖ of immutability by which any other sense of immutability 
would fall.
24
 Following the tradition of the Church, Ware affirms that God changes 
neither for better nor for worse, since,  
 [e]ither course of change is precluded by his being eternally self-sufficient. God 
cannot gain any value, since he eternally encompasses all such value in his own 
intrinsic being. And God certainly does not lose any value in his creation of lesser 
reality, since Scripture‘s affirmation that God does not change refers fundamentally, 
then, to his ontological immutability, to the changelessness of who he ever is as 
God.
25
  
 
Thus God is ontologically immutable in His supreme divine nature and divine attributes. 
He does not vary in His existence; rather, He is as He has always been.  
 Second, when Ware speaks of God‘s ethical immutability, he means that God is 
faithful and reliable in His ―unconditional promises‖ and ―moral obligations.‖26 Ethical 
immutability, which is a ―second-order‖ sense of immutability,  ―presupposes (1) God‘s 
ontological changelessness, (2) the existence of a contingent and temporal moral order, 
and (3) the free decision of God to pledge himself to his creatures in certain ways that 
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accord with his intrinsic nature.‖27 God‘s promises and commitments toward his creatures 
were ―freely-determined‖ and were not ―necessary.‖ He neither had to create the 
temporal world, consisting of a moral order, nor did He have to pledge Himself to such 
commitments or promises; rather, God freely chose to bind Himself to such promises and 
commitments, which are ―freely self-imposed and self-determined.‖28  
 One important feature brought out by Ware‘s emphasis on God‘s ethical 
immutability is the notion that it is grounded in God‘s ontological immutability. It is 
God‘s ontological immutability which makes it possible for God to carry out His 
promises and commitments.
29
 This leads Ware to his next point. 
 While Scripture affirms God‘s ―onto-ethical immutability,‖ it also affirms God‘s 
―relational mutability,‖ i.e., the fact that God changes in his relationships toward His 
creatures.
30
 Scripture, says Ware, ―speaks about the active intimate and concerned 
involvement of God with His creation, an involvement that includes innumerable changes 
on the part of God and on the part of His creatures.‖31 Scripture makes abundantly clear 
that God changes in His actions and responses toward His creatures. For instance, God 
changes from judgment and wrath to forgiveness and mercy toward a sinner who repents 
or, as in the case of God‘s covenant people, Israel, God changes from blessing to cursing. 
God‘s changing in His relationships toward His creatures does not entail that God 
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changes in His intrinsic nature. Instead of diminishing God‘s immutability, God‘s 
relational mutability demonstrates it.  
 Thus when the human moral state changes (e.g., from rebellion to repentance) the immutable 
divine nature must now reflect itself in ways that are appropriate to this new situation. Hence 
changes in God‘s attitudes and actions are naturally brought about as God consistently 
applies the standards and requirements of his constant moral nature in ways that correspond 
to the moral changes continually undergone by his creatures.
32
   
    
But what of those instances in Scripture which speak of God ―changing His mind‖ or 
―repenting‖? How can an all-knowing, maximally cognitive being, change His mind or 
repent, since an action such as ―changing one‘s mind‖ or ―repenting‖ indicates that one 
comes to know something not previously known or to discover something new? One 
possible response is to suggest that when scripture speaks of God changing His mind or 
repenting that such passages are speaking of God anthropomorphically. Often these 
anthropomorphic passages are instances where God changes His ―mode of action and 
attitude in response to a changed human situation.‖33 Thus, these anthropomorphisms are 
in reality metaphorical statements which refer to God‘s relational mutability.  
 Within his discussion of divine immutability, Ware focuses on one final issue, 
whether the emotions described of God in Scripture are genuine emotions or whether 
they are anthropomorphism. Closely linked to God‘s immutability is the theological 
doctrine of impassability. Theologians use the term ―impassability‖ in two ways, says 
Ware. First, theologians understand the doctrine to mean ―God‘s freedom from external 
influence on his nature and will.‖34 God can neither be acted upon nor can He be 
―conditioned‖ by anything outside of Himself. The second sense of impassibility suggests 
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that God lacks any ―negative emotions,‖ such as divine ―anger or wrath.‖ Ware affirms 
the first sense of impassibility, while he rejects the second sense. He concludes that while 
God‘s emotions are not like our own, nonetheless, we should affirm Scripture‘s use of 
such emotions ascribed to God. Ware thinks the primary reason some have rejected 
ascribing any kind of emotion to God is due to the false conception that emotions are ―a 
form of weakness, a limitation, a disturbance to one‘s inner life that resulted often to 
mishap or poor judgment.‖35 But not all emotions are ―weaknesses‖ or ―mishaps‖. 
Emotions, when used correctly, argues Ware, ―have potential for good‖ and can ―stir up 
toward holiness or compassion or faithfulness.‖36 Therefore, it is appropriate to attribute 
emotions to God, especially given the abundant evidence in Scripture. Thus, God‘s 
changing in emotions, too, is a part of God‘s relational mutability.  
 Ware‘s distinction between God‘s onto-ethical immutability and His relational 
mutability helps to clarify the many passages in Scripture which seem to indicate that 
God is immutable, on the one hand, and changing on the other. But as Ware adamantly 
emphasizes, God‘s changing in His relationships toward His creatures is grounded in His 
onto-ethical immutability. God always fulfills His promises. He is faithful and could not 
be otherwise. Much like Richards‘ accidental properties, God‘s relational acts are non-
essential to God‘s nature, yet when God promises or commits to His creatures, God freely 
binds Himself to the these relationships.  
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Toward a Barthian Affirmation of the Doctrine of Divine Immutability  
 In this attempt to express the doctrine of divine immutable, we have sought to 
understand it in light of Scripture‘s teaching. Contra Process theology, the doctrine of 
immutability should be affirmed, yet, it seems that immutability, as found in eternalism, 
is taken beyond Scripture‘s portrayal of the doctrine. Scripture teaches that God is 
immutable, but it also teaches that God changes in His relationships and His actions. 
Thus He is the one who creates, sustains, redeems, judges, shows mercy and wrath, 
forgives, demonstrates patience, and loves. Perhaps a better statement of God‘s 
unchangingness could be found in something akin to Karl Barth‘s positive affirmation of 
the doctrine in His Church Dogmatics.  
 God is certainly ―immutable,‖ says Barth, but not in the sense that He is 
―immobile‖ or ―motionless‖; rather, God is immutable in the Biblical sense, in which, He 
is ―the living God‖ possessing ―mobility‖ and ―elasticity.‖ 37 Barth prefers to speak of 
God as ―constant,‖ since the word ―immutable‖ is ―suspiciously negative.‖38 It is God‘s 
constancy which ―differentiates‖ God from all else, i.e., all that is ―distinct from 
Himself.‖39  Barth points out that God‘s creating and sustaining ―a reality distinct from 
Himself‖ is an ―expression‖ of God‘s life.40 Yet God creates out of His own perfect love, 
which is free, and not out of any necessity. When God becomes Lord by virtue of His 
creating, He does not change or alter in who He is. Rather, God is the means and 
―ground‖ of creation‘s life and existence, yet He is not identified with this creaturely life 
                                                 
 
37
 Ibid., 496.  
  
 
38
 Ibid., 495. 
  
 
39
 Ibid., 491. 
  
 
40
 Ibid., 499.  
46 
 
and existence. God has a life and vitality of His own, independent of and free from the 
life that He gives to creation. Further, Barth draws attention to the fact that God has ―a 
real history in and with the world created by Him.‖41 Yet God is the ―subject‖ of all 
History, which is preeminently demonstrated through Jesus Christ. 
 Barth‘s notion of constancy resonates with Ware‘s distinction between God‘s 
―onto-ethical immutability‖ and God‘s ―relational mutability‖ and with Richards‘ 
―theological essentialism.‖  On the one hand, like Ware and Richards, Barth recognizes 
that God does not increase or decrease or alter in His being or essence. He neither grows 
weary nor fatigued; rather, He is the self-same in His divine unchanging essence. On the 
other hand, Barth affirms that in whatever actions God performs, He remains constant in 
His being. Similar to Ware‘s relational mutability, God‘s acting and moving in the world 
is what Barth calls the ―holy mutability of God.‖42 Yet it is only through God‘s constancy 
that God can perform the kinds of actions attributed to Him by Scripture. Furthermore, 
God‘s acting and relating to His creatures or His becoming incarnate in Jesus Christ is 
not done out of any obligation to the creation, rather, it is out of God‘s free ―decision‖ to 
create and to act and to become incarnate.  
 
Conclusion 
 Thus, the view of immutability posited here is a strong sense of immutability, but 
not in the absolute sense found eternalism. Further, such a conception of immutability is 
grounded in scriptural witness, but at the same time allows for scripture‘s affirmation of 
                                                 
 
 
41
 Ibid., 502.  
 
 
42
 Ibid., 496. 
47 
 
God‘s changing in His actions and relationships toward His people. Thus we conclude 
with Millard Erickson: 
 The God we find in Scripture is not a static being as in Aristotle‘s God. He is rather an 
active, dynamic being, at work in the world. This dynamic activity, however, is stable, not 
unstable. His actions are in keeping with his fundamental nature, with his values, plans, and 
decisions . . . There is nothing to lead us to believe that God acts at any point in conflict with 
his nature.
43
  
 
The God of Scripture does not change in His essence, nor does He grow or alter. He is 
constant in His being and active in the world.    
  
Change, Creation and Incarnation 
 
 
 Now that we have examined the doctrine of immutability in view of scriptures 
teaching on it and in view of some recent treatments of the doctrine, we shall examine 
two objections to the doctrine of absolute immutability and divine timelessness.  
 
Divine Timelessness and the Problem of Atemporal Sustaining  
  
 The Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo, i.e., that the universe and all things 
within the universe came into existence out of nothing (not-anything), is essential to the 
classical Christian worldview, and it finds abundant support in Scripture.
44
 Creation ex 
nihilo entered into the Christian tradition through Hebraic tradition and was advocated by 
the Church Fathers.
45
 According to John 1:2, ―all things came into being‖ through the 
Word. Similarly, the Apostle Paul, when speaking of the preincarnate Son of God, tells us 
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that ―by Him all things were created, [both] in the heavens and on earth, visible and 
invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities—all things have been 
created through Him and for Him. And He is before all things, and in Him all things hold 
together.‖ (Col 1:16-17) Not only does God bring into existence everything within the 
universe through the Word, but He also sustains everything within creation. Hence, the 
universe is contingent and dependent on God for its existence. 
 According to Thomas Aquinas, ―God‘s action, which is without pre-existing 
mater and is called creation, is neither a motion nor a change, properly speaking.‖46 To 
say that God ―creates‖, is to say that God produces or causes the whole of creation ―by 
His intellect and will.‖47 James Ross, an avid Thomist, calls this kind of causation 
―metaphysical causation‖48, i.e., a kind of causation that is continuous and 
―instantaneous.‖ 49 A metaphysical cause includes not only the effect, but the cause itself 
in the effect.  
 Metaphysical effects are never separated by any space-time interval from their causes as are 
the typical event-sequence explained by scientific law. Again, just the reverse. The 
metaphysical cause is ―everywhere‖ in its effect, and its causing is coextensive 
spatiotemporally with the being of the effect, the way that crystal geometry is everywhere in 
the crystal it forms.
50
 
 
God‘s producing creation is analogous to a thinker‘s producing a thought or to a 
dreamer‘s producing a dream.  However, claims Ross, this is not to say that God is  
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somehow intrinsically a part of the thing being produced.
51
 Concerning God‘s creating 
the universe, Ross explains: 
 Creation is a universal force, like a light that causes things to be (visible), but which would 
have been unchanged had other things been caused to be (visible) instead. For God‘s 
understanding – to make some purely conceptual distinctions – the election, but not 
production, of things flows. God is a radiant force, present everywhere, throughout 
everything that actually is, even throughout the gravitational writhing of otherwise empty 
space (if there is any) and, therefore, throughout physical space-time itself, causing it to be.
52
  
 
For both Aquinas and Ross, God‘s producing the universe and God‘s sustaining the 
universe seems to be one continuous eternal act. Concerning God‘s creation and 
sustaining, Aquinas says ―a thing is being created and is already created at the same 
time.‖53  
  But could not the objection be raised that God‘s sustaining a temporal 
universe suggests that He is temporal, since God now stands in a causal relationship by 
sustaining creation? William Lane Craig explains: 
 Once time begins at the moment of creation, either God becomes temporal in virtue of His 
real relation to the world or else He exists just as timelessly with creation as He does without 
it. If we choose the first alternative, then, once again, God is temporal. But what about the 
second alternative? Can God remain untouched by the world‘s temporality? It seems not. For 
at the first moment of time, God stands in a new relation in which He did not stand before 
(since there was no ―before‖). Even if in creating the world God undergoes no intrinsic 
change, He at least undergoes extrinsic change. For at the moment of creation, God comes 
into the relation of sustaining the universe or, at the very least, of co-existing with the 
universe, relations in which He did not stand before. Thus, even if it is not the case that God 
is temporal prior to His creation of the world, He nonetheless undergoes an extrinsic change 
at the moment of creation which draws Him into time in virtue of His real relation to the 
world.
54
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Eternalists, such as Aquinas and Ross, would, however, reject the notion that God‘s 
having created the universe causes Him to undergo extrinsic change, or any kind of 
change for that matter. But what about God‘s ―acting in the world‖ or ―sustaining the 
world‖?  
 Before examining the eternalist‘s response, it would be beneficial to probe 
deeper the kind of argument presented here by Craig. Is it possible for an atemporal being 
to sustain or act within a temporal universe without Himself becoming temporal? Part of 
the answer to this question depends on how one defines time. In what follows, the two 
main theories of time shall be examined, followed by an exposition of the above 
argument by William Lane Craig and Alan Padgett. After examining the Craig-Padgett 
argument for the impossibility of atemporal sustaining, we shall then turn to Paul Helm‘s 
defense of eternalism.  
 
Two Views on Time 
 According to J. M. E. McTaggart, there are two ways of looking at a series of 
positions in time. First, time theorists understand one type of series of positions as either 
having an ‗earlier than‘ or ‗later than‘ relation, otherwise known as a B series. The 
second way of understanding a series position in time is what is known as an A series. An 
A series understands positions in time as being either past or present or future. McTaggart 
held that both the A and B series‘ have problems, which led him to believe in the 
paradoxical conclusion of the unreality of time.
55
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 The B series of time (or the B-theory)
56
 is also known as the ―static‖ or ―stasis‖ 
view of time.
57
 When philosophers of time speak of the B-theory of time, they mean, as 
with McTaggart, that time consists of ―earlier than‖ and ―later than‖ relations, yet, these 
relations are part of a ―four-dimensional space-time solid.‖58 In other words, all moments 
of time coexist. According to Russell Stannard, a proponent of the B-theory of time, time 
must be understood as a fourth prong to our universe. We can imagine the universe 
existing with its three dimensions of space and one dimension of time as a four 
dimensional space-time block. Past, present and future are all a part of the universe, and 
hence, time in this way is static. Every point of time, like space, has ―equal footing.‖ 
There is no privileged point of time. All time exists, including the future.
59
  
 One must also not get lured into thinking of a separate time outside four-dimensional space-
time . . . What it means is that four-dimensional space-time does not change. Something can 
only change in time. But space-time is not in time . . . So, for example, at this instant in time 
not only does Portsmouth exist, but also New York, Hong Kong, planet Jupiter, and distant 
galaxies. So all of space exists at each point in time. What this is saying is that likewise at 
each point in space, all of time exists. At this point of space here—in this hall—all of time 
exists: the day work started on building the hall, the instant you entered it this morning, this 
present moment, your leaving it, the day the hall gets demolished. It all exists here—in some 
sense. I stress ―in some sense.‖60 
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However, Stannard recognizes the tension that exists between the physical nature of the 
universe and the universal notion of the ―now‖ of time. He proposes that our mental 
experience of the world and the world as it actually is are two separate ways of viewing 
time, ―[w]hat this means is that all of physical time exists at the instant of mental time 
called ‗now‘—and indeed at every other instant of mental time.‖61 In a similar manner, J. 
J. C. Smart argues that the notion of temporal becoming is ―anthropocentric.‖62 Smart 
goes on to say ―instead of talking of things or processes changing or not changing we can 
now talk of one time slice or four-dimensional entity being different or not different from 
some other time slice.‖63 Central to the B-theory of time is the notion that there is no real 
change, only the appearance of change. Any appearance of change, claims the B-theorist, 
is mind dependent and thus, if there were no human beings, then neither would there be 
the concept of past, present and future. 
 In contrast to the B-theory, the A-theory of time, also known as the ―dynamic‖ or 
―process‖ view of time, recognizes the reality of temporal becoming.64 Fundamental to 
the A-theory is the notion that the past is truly past, i.e., that the past is no more, and that 
the future has not yet come into existence.  Only the ―present episode of an object 
exists.‖65 Unlike the B-theory, the dynamic view of time recognizes that the process of 
change is an ontological reality of the universe, not mind dependent.  
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The Argument from the Impossibility of Atemporal Sustaining  
  Now that both theories on time have been examined, attention shall be given to 
Craig‘s argument for God‘s temporality based on the impossibility of atemporal 
sustaining and acting in a temporal universe. Consider the following argument: 
 1. God is creatively active in the temporal world 
  
 2. If God is creatively active in the temporal world, God is really related to the 
temporal world   
 
 3. If God is really related to the temporal world, God is temporal 
 
 4. Therefore, God is temporal.
66
 
 
As Craig reminds us, this argument does not argue for God‘s essential temporality; 
rather, that God is temporal by virtue of being Creator of a temporal world.
67
 Craig thinks 
that (1) is an essential belief for Christian theism. The crucial part of Craig‘s argument is 
(2). ―It seems,‖ claims Craig, ―inconceivable that God‘s causal relation to the world and 
the events/things in it could be regarded as anything other than a real relation. Indeed, 
God‘s being related to the world as cause to effect seems to be a paradigm example of a 
real relation.‖68 Thus (3) is derived from the ―inconceivability of divorcing an agent‘s 
being form his actions or his actions from their effects in such a way that the effects 
could be temporal but the agent timeless.‖ If God created the world as an A-series, that is 
consisting of a true past, present and future, then God sustains each event that takes place.  
 Similarly, Alan Padgett raises an objection to the notion of an atemporal being 
acting within a temporal universe. According Padgett, for the universe to remain in 
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existence, it must at all times be sustained by God. Everything, including matter, energy 
and the natural laws within the universe are sustained by God. Thus if God were to stop 
sustaining the universe, then the universe would simply cease to exist, or as Thomas 
Aquinas put it: ―Were God to annihilate, it would not be through some action (per 
aliquam actionem) but through the cessation from action.‖69 Each moment of God‘s 
sustaining creation is ―a direct act.‖70 A direct act, claims Padgett, is an act God performs 
such that it ―excludes any created causal chain between the divine cause and its effect.‖71 
All causes and effects which God sustains through His direct acts are ―Zero Time 
Related,‖72 i.e., no time takes place between God‘s direct act and ―its immediate effect.‖73 
Now consider two events, B and C, suggests Padgett: 
 Say that God acts such that, at some time T4, some episode B of an object was sustained. 
Further, at the present time, T5, God acts so as to sustain a different object‘s episode, C, 
which is in the same place as B. Now T4 and T5 are some distance apart in time, and not 
Zero Time Related. Can the same divine, eternal, immutable act sustain both B and C? Since 
T5 [sic; read: T4] is not, B no longer exists, and so is not being sustained, either in our time 
or in eternity, by any act of God. Since God‘s sustaining of C is direct, he cannot (logically 
cannot) sustain C by an act whose effect is dated at T4, and by some causal chain indirectly 
sustains C-at-T5. Furthermore, the present effect of God‘s eternal act at T5 is Zero Time 
Related with the eternal intention of God; but this same eternal intention and act cannot also 
be Zero Time Related to B, since B and C are not themselves Zero Time Related. By a 
single, timeless act God can sustain C and any episode Zero Time Related to C. But since the 
divine sustaining is a direct act which must be Zero Time Related to its effect, the same 
divine act cannot sustain both C and B. At the present time (T5) B is not real, and so a 
different act (different, that is, than the act which sustained B) is now called for if God is to 
sustain C. The particular intention plus power-to-act, such that B-atT4 is sustained, can only 
sustain episodes Zero Time Related to T4.
74
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Given the A-theory of time, all that truly exists is the present. The past no longer exists 
and the future has not yet come into existence. The force of Padgett‘s argument is that 
each direct act of God‘s sustaining some event is intentional and volitional. Craig, 
commenting on this point in Padgett‘s argument, points out that ―[t]he act of power 
whereby God produced B is not the same act of power by which He is producing C, for at 
t4 C was not being produced. Since God is sustaining C and no longer sustaining B, 
therefore, He has changed.‖75 Now the objector may respond by suggesting that any 
event that takes place in time occurs because God timelessly wills that it occur. But this 
depends on what one means by ―will.‖ If ―will‖ means design, then God‘s timelessly 
willing some event to take place would be feasible, but if the notions of ―intention‖ and 
―power-to-act‖ are included, then the objector‘s argument fails because the effects of 
God‘s intending and the bringing about of some future event do not yet exist.76     
   If Craig and Padgett‘s arguments are correct, then it would seem that an 
atemporal being could not sustain or act within a temporal universe, without somehow 
becoming temporal by virtue of His sustaining the universe. But this argument can be 
turned. The pinch of their arguments depends on both Craig and Padgett‘s commitment to 
an A-theory of time. Suppose that a B-theory of time were true, would it not then be 
possible that God timelessly sustains the universe without changing and without 
becoming temporal by virtue of His sustaining the entire space-time universe. This is 
exactly the point argued for by Paul Helm. In what follows, Helm‘s argument for the 
possibility of God‘s sustaining the universe, apart from change, will be examined. 
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The Eternalist Response  
 Contra Craig and Padgett, Helm argues that God‘s creation and sustaining of the 
universe occurs apart from any change. According to Helm, God does not ―act‖ in the 
universe. For if God were to act in the universe, then God would be temporal; rather, one 
should speak of God timelessly (tenselessly) producing the entire space-time universe. 
God‘s producing the universe is not a change in God nor is it a change ―in time . . . . 
Rather it is the free determination of the mind to bring about what is chosen.‖77 Thus, like 
Aquinas, Helm believes that God‘s bringing about something is directly related to God‘s 
eternal unchanging will. Now by ―producing‖, Helm means that God tenselessly brings 
about the entire space-time universe through one eternal act.  
 For Helm, God‘s producing the universe involves two features: the logical 
contingency of the universe and that ―the universe has temporal development.‖78 If God 
would not have willed the universe, then it would have never come into existence. But 
how should we understand the temporal development of the universe? What would such a 
universe look like? Here is where the B-theory of time becomes important for Helm. He 
recognizes that if God had created the space-time universe as an A-series of temporal 
relations, then God would be temporal.   
 So it makes better sense for the eternalist to suppose that God created the temporal order as a 
B-series. Form the divine standpoint no one moment of the series would be privileged by 
being present, but as regards presentness, pastness or futurity, all moments would be in 
exactly the same position, even though some moments would be earlier in relation to others 
in the series, some later. It is a temporal order, in which causal powers operate. And yet it is 
a B-series of rather special kind, whose every moment is also eternally present to God. 
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Within a B-series, events are fixed. There is no true becoming as there is in the A-series; 
rather, all events occur in ―earlier than‖ and ―later than‖ relations. Now if God creates the 
entire space-time universe, with all events existing tenselessly within the created order, 
then God‘s timelessness and strong immutability is preserved, since God‘s sustaining of 
the space-time universe is one eternal act.  
 Helm‘s view of creation hinges on making a distinction between, (what I shall 
call) ―logical causation‖ and ―temporal causation‖. For the eternalist, ―there need be no 
temporal first moment of creation, and so the universe need not have begun (temporally) 
to exist‖,80 says Helm. All that is required is a logical contingency. The temporal universe 
that exists is a contingent existence. Thus the relation that God has to the temporal 
universe is an eternal relation. God could have eternally decreed that a different world 
exist or that no world exist, but this does not imply that the world have a temporal 
beginning. Scripture only implies that the contingency of the universe be such that ―its 
existence is not logically necessary, and that it owes its existence to the agency of God—
it depends on him.‖81 There is no temporal ―before‖, when scripture speaks of God 
existing before the creation; rather, God‘s existing before the creation means that God 
exists in a logical priority, i.e., a ―hierarchical‖ relation to the universe.  
So claims Helm, 
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  . . . God is before the creation not by virtue of existing at a time when the universe was not 
yet in existence, but by virtue of his necessity and the creation‘s contingency and of the 
universe‘s causal dependence on him. Everything created (except the temporal order itself) is 
necessarily in time, mutable and (so) corruptible; anything that exists uncreatedly is 
necessarily eternal, immutable and incorruptible.‖82  
 
Helm recognizes that the way he is using ―cause‖, as in ―a timeless God‘s causing or 
bringing about the universe‖, is a stretch from the usual sense; however, says Helm, 
causality does not require temporality.
83
 To give an analogy of what Helm has in mind 
when he speaks of God having a hierarchical causal relation to the world, we could 
imagine a timeless world w* in which the god of that world, Atlas, holds the world on 
His back without any change. Atlas sustains the world with his power. If Atlas where not 
there, then neither would be the world. Therefore, Atlas is necessary and the world is 
dependent upon Him.
84
 Yet, as stated earlier, the reason for the world‘s existing is a result 
of God‘s eternally willing it so. God‘s willing the universe does not change and neither 
does God‘s eternal action.  To say that God creates the universe means that God 
tenselessly produces the entire space-time universe. While there is temporal order within 
the universe, the universe itself has no beginning. If there is no beginning to the universe 
then it would seem that God does not change in bringing the universe into existence and, 
given the B-theory of time, God does not change by sustaining each temporal event. 
 Now that the arguments against and for the possibility of God‘s sustaining a 
temporal universe have been examined, a critique of the eternalist‘s position shall be 
given.    
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Critique of the Eternalist’s Response 
 
 If eternalism is correct, then God does not sustain each individual event as they 
pass in and out of existence; rather, God timelessly and tenselessly sustains the entire 
space-time universe, all events included, by and through one eternal act. On such a view, 
William Lane Craig points out: 
 The picture of God existing alone without the universe and bringing the universe into 
existence at t = 0 presupposes the reality of temporal becoming and thus a dynamic theory of 
time. But on the static theory, God and the universe are coeternal; even the incarnation of the 
second person of the Trinity is an unchanging state. The four-dimensional space-time 
universe is temporal only in the sense that one of its internal dimensions is time; extrinsically 
it exists as timelessly as God. Creation is reduced to the ontological dependence of the 
universe on God.
85
  
 
While such a notion as the ―ontological dependence of the universe on God‖ might seem 
odd to many Christian theists, it is nevertheless logically consistent.  
 But why think God created the space-time universe as a B-series? Helm provides 
no justification for adopting the B-theory other than it preserves eternalism. He thinks 
that in any ―philosophical position‖ there is a ―trade off‖. For the eternalist, it means 
giving up a view of time that allows for temporal change and becoming. On the other 
hand, the temporalist position, such as that of Craig and Padgett‘s, rejects pure eternalism 
in favor of an A-theory of time.
86
 
 Helm‘s point is taken—there is a tradeoff. Nevertheless, an A time series is 
ontologically different than a B time series, and ultimately, how one views time is a 
statement about how one views reality. The question one must wrestle with is whether 
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one‘s view of time meets the facts about the way things really are. It is not enough for a 
metaphysical theory to be logically consistent, but it must also include ―factually 
adequacy‖ and provide ―explanatory power.‖87 Thus the truth of either the A-theory or B-
theory of time is just one of the factors pertaining to a theory of God‘s temporal mode of 
existence, and it must be considered, since, as was shown, whichever view one holds has 
significant implications on the problem of atemporal causality brought up by Craig and 
Padgett. Thus in what follows three arguments for an A-theory will be examined. 
  
Argument from Time’s Arrow and the Expanding Universe 
 Until recently, the majority scientific view has been that the universe always 
existed.
88
 But this view began to change with the introduction of new empirical evidence 
pointing to a beginning of the space-time universe. The current working cosmological 
theory of the universe is that time, along with space, came into existence from an 
―explosion‖ called the ―Big Bang.‖ According Paul Davies, ―whether one accepts all the 
details or not, the essential hypothesis – that there was some sort of creation – seems 
from the scientific point of view, compelling.‖89 Albert Einstein predicted the Big Bang 
model of the universe while developing his theory of general relativity. What the theory 
of general relativity demonstrates is that the universe is ―simultaneously expanding and 
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decelerating.‖90 Such a view of an expanding universe would mean that something like an 
explosion had taken place. What evidence is there for such an explosion? 
 The first bit of empirical evidence supporting the ―Big bang‖ is what scientists 
call a ―red shift.‖ In 1929 Edwin Hubble, while studying the distance between different 
galaxies, discovered ―redshifting‖, which is a ―shift in the spectrum of light emitted by 
the stars‖91 of distant galaxies. What this indicated is that the universe is expanding.92 
The second piece of evidence was discovered in 1964 by two scientists, Arno Penzias and 
Robert Wilson, who, while adjusting a communications satellite, discovered microwave 
background radiation in the universe.
93
 Gerald Schroeder describes this background 
radiation as ―a radiation background that is constant and equal in all directions of the 
universe.‖94 The background radiation confirmed what astrophysicists predicted would be 
necessary for such an explosion as the ―Big Bang.‖ Additional evidence for the expansion 
of the universe is the second law of thermodynamics. As scientists examine the universe, 
they see it gradually heading toward a state of disorder. The second law of 
thermodynamics states that once energy is converted from one form to another, some of it 
(useful energy) is lost in the process.
95
 Eventually all of the energy in the universe will be 
used up. Scientists have come up with ways to measure the amount of disorder in the 
universe left from used up energy. This is known as entropy. If the universe only has so 
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much energy, then it would seem that eventually it would come to an end. As Paul Davies 
puts it: 
 If the universe has a finite stock of order, and is changing irreversibly towards disorder—
ultimately to thermodynamic equilibrium—two very deep inferences follow immediately. 
The first is that the universe will eventually die, wallowing, as it were, in its own entropy. 
This is known among physicists as the ‗heat death‘ of the universe. The second is that the 
universe cannot have existed forever, otherwise it would have reached its equilibrium end 
state an infinite time ago. Conclusion: the universe did not always exist.
96
    
 
One of the inferences we can make from the above data is that there is an arrow to time. 
The other inference is that the universe will eventually come to an end.
 97
 If the universe 
had a beginning and will have an end, and it seems as though the universe is moving in a 
certain direction, then the dynamic or A-theory of time, based on the above evidence, 
seems to be the most plausible explanation for the nature of time in our universe. 
 
Argument from Temporal Becoming     
 If the B-theory of time is true then the notion of temporal becoming is merely 
mind-dependent. Thus if there were no humans, then, there would be no need for 
reference to past, present and future. Any time relations would be either ―earlier than‖ or 
―later than.‖ 98 Against such a view, William Lane Craig presents the following 
argument: 
 1. The temporal becoming of mental events is either mind-dependent or it is not. 
 2. If it is not, then temporal becoming is objective. 
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 3. If it is, then temporal becoming is objective. 
 4. Therefore, temporal becoming is objective.
99
 
The force of Craig‘s argument is that no matter which premise one goes after, it turns out 
that temporal becoming would be objective. If a static time theorist attacked premise two 
by denying that temporal becoming is mind dependent, then it seems that temporal 
becoming would be objective, otherwise, temporal becoming is just an illusion.  
 Craig lists two outs for the defender of the B-theory. First, the defender of the B-
theory could hold to a kind of hybrid view where events outside of the mind are 
changeless, existing as ―earlier than‖ and ―later than‖ relations, while events in the mind 
truly have temporal becoming. But as Craig points out, such a view leads to an ―absurd 
dualism.‖100  Craig goes on to say: 
 . . . why do I have the ―now-awareness‖ of time t1 instead of t2? All the physical 
brain states at t1 and t2 never change, yet my now-awareness does change and is 
uniquely located. Why is there one privileged now-awareness?
101
  
 
Further, Craig pinpoints two main problems with the theory that temporal becoming is 
mind dependent: Why time goes in a direction and why human beings seem to ―share the 
same now.‖102  
 The second out for the B-theorist is to claim that mental events are as ―equally 
real‖ as other events within the space-time universe, i.e., mental events are ―strung out‖ 
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along different points within the ―earlier than‖ and ―later than‖ relations.103 Thus one‘s 
―now-awareness‖ of today is as equally real as one‘s ―now-awareness‖ of yesterday or 
tomorrow. Mental events are just as locked into the changelessness of reality as are any 
other events. But the obvious problem with this is that such a view denies experience 
altogether.  
 Thus the view that temporal becoming is merely mind dependant is incoherent. It 
leads to the notion that all experience is just an illusion, and as Craig points out, even the 
illusion of temporal becoming ―is self-refuting, since such an illusion itself involves 
becoming.‖104    
 
Argument from Creation Ex Nihilo 
 The Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo, i.e., that the universe and all things 
within the universe came into existence out of nothing (not-anything), is essential to the 
classical Christian worldview, and it finds abundant support in Scripture.
105
 Creation ex 
nihilo entered into the Christian tradition through Hebraic tradition and was advocated by 
the Church Fathers.
106
 According to John 1:2, ―all things came into being‖ through the 
Word. Similarly, the Apostle Paul, when speaking of the preincarnate Son of God, tells us 
that ―by Him all things were created, [both] in the heavens and on earth, visible and 
invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities--all things have been 
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created through Him and for Him. And He is before all things, and in Him all things hold 
together.‖ (Col 1:16-17) Not only does God bring into existence everything within the 
universe through the Word, but He also sustains everything within creation. Hence, the 
universe is contingent and dependent on God for its existence. 
 But what does it mean to say that God creates something. First of all, one would 
expect that the notion of God‘s creating the universe to fall under God‘s omnipotence. If 
God is omnipotent, then God has the ability to bring it about that something other than 
God exists (say creation). But as was pointed out earlier, it seems that God‘s power-to-act 
is grounded in His will and intention. God wills something and whatever God wills 
comes about. Second, as Nelson Pike points out, the word ‗creation‘ lacks a certain 
quality that we often attribute to ―production-verbs.‖ It is different from, say, ―to build‖ 
or ―to make.‖ For, ―to build‖ or ―to make‖ something implies that there exists something 
in which one can use to perform those kinds of actions. For instance, we might use brick 
and mortar to build a house. When God created, He used no pre-existing materials. Pike 
suggests that God‘s creating the universe carries more of the connotation of ―conjuring 
up‖ something, e.g. that one conjures up an image.107 But if eternalism is true, could this 
be said of God? Could God bring something into existence out of nothing? It would seem 
not. According to Helm, creation is logically contingent. There is no temporal beginning 
to creation. God timelessly produces the entire space-time universe through one eternal 
act. Further, for God to act by bringing creation into existence would mean that God 
changes (at least in an extrinsic kind of way) which is an impossibility for God.
108
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Perhaps an analogy may help to elucidate the problem with the eternalist‘s position. 
 Let us imagine an atemporal projector. Within this projector is a generator of sorts 
that produces light, and in turn causes an image to be projected. This projector, however; 
has the unusual capability of projecting not just one frame, but the entire filmstrip at 
once. The image being produced is contingent on the projector which tenselessly 
produces the image. But at what point does the projector begin to produce the image, turn 
on, so to speak.  Obviously, if the projector is tenselessly producing the image, it does not 
seem that there ever was a point when the image began to be projected.  
 Now this analogy, like any analogy, is limited, since the scenes being projected 
would have to be viewed by an atemporal observer. Nevertheless, the point of the 
analogy is that if creation is merely logically dependent on God, then there is no coming 
into being of creation. The whole of the images being projected are analogous to the 
whole of creation. All of the frames exist in one projected image without any changing 
from scene to scene. The projector itself, which produces the frames, is analogous to God 
who tenselessly produces the entire space-time universe. Thus there is no change in 
God‘s action and there is no change in creation.  
 The problem with eternalism on this point is that it emasculates the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo. Eternalist‘s, such as Helm, adopt the ―logical dependency view‖ of 
creation in order to preserve the doctrine of absolute immutability. While scripture 
affirms that God is immutable in a strong sense, the view that God is absolutely 
immutable is neither espoused by scripture nor can one come to such conclusions based 
on Scripture‘s teaching. Further, to say that creation is merely ―logically dependent‖ 
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seems to limit God‘s omnipotence to nothing more than God‘s changelessly sustaining 
the universe. Such a conception boarders a Deistic view of the God-world relation.  
 
Divine Timelessness and the Incarnation 
 It seems that for God the Son to become incarnate it would require Him to be 
located in space-time. But if God is timeless, then how can the Son of God take upon 
human flesh and yet remain timeless, especially, when Scripture speaks of the Son 
experiencing temporal relation to creation through the incarnation? If the incarnation is 
indeed, the cornerstone of the Christian faith, then the discussion on God‘s relationship to 
space-time must consider it. First, in what is below, we shall examine two passages that 
suggest the Son of God entered into space-time. Second, it will be shown that the 
language used by the early Fathers indicated that the Son entered into our space-time 
world. If God the Son entered into space-time, then whatever it means for God to be 
eternal, must take into consideration the possibility of such an event as the incarnation. 
Third, a philosophical argument for the Son‘s temporality will be given and defended.   
 
Biblical Argument for the Son’s Temporality 
 
 John 1:14 speaks of the Word becoming flesh, ―and the Word became flesh and 
dwelt among us.‖ It is clear from the context that the is referring to Jesus Christ. 
John bore witness of him (vv. 7 and15) and it is through him that grace and truth are 
realized. But what of the  ―becoming flesh‖? Here the word used for become is 
which comes from . is an aorist and functions as an 
ingressive, which means the beginning of a past occurrence. This is the same verb used in 
John 1:3, which is a reference to ‗all things‘ coming into being. However,  does 
68 
 
not take that understanding here. As George Beasley-Murray asserts, ―the verb  
in connection with a predicative noun expresses that a person or a thing changes its 
property or enters into a new condition, becomes something that it was not before.‖109 
There is no indication from John that the Word ceases being the Word. In this case, the 
Word ‗becomes‘ flesh means that the Word enters into a new relation by adding flesh, or 
becoming human.   
 The word  is found in the predicate nominative position. In this context, 
suggests the ―one who is or becomes a physical being, living being with flesh,‖110 
or again, as Wallace affirms, ― expresses that state into which the Divine Word 
entered by a definite act.‖111 The language expressed here of the Word‘s ―becoming 
flesh‖ is rather strong. It is hard to see how one could limit the language used here as 
anthropomorphic or poetic. As Timothy George puts it: 
What is flesh? Flesh is that part of our human reality which in fact is most susceptible to the 
ravaging of time. It is flesh that suffers pain. It is flesh that contracts cancer. It is flesh that 
we bury in the ground. This is what the Son of God became for us, says the Christian faith. 
This idea was, and still is, a remarkably shocking thought. It was put forth in the early 
Church over against the docetists, people who said that in Jesus Christ the Word of God 
touched the earth much as a tangent touches a circle, but that was it. In appearance Jesus 
seemed to be a real human being, but in fact this was not the case. He was a phantom-like 
apparition, a ghost. 
  Against this idea, Ignatius of Antioch and the early Christian fathers say again and again, 
he was ‗truly‘ born of the Virgin Mary. They use the Greek adverb alēthōs which means 
‗really,‘ ‗truly,‘ ‗surely.‘ That is why it got into the Apostles‘ Creed. He was really crucified 
under Pontius Pilate. He was really buried. He really, truly, rose again.‖112 
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Now by ―becoming,‖ we are not here suggesting that there was any mixing or 
altering of the two natures, nor are we implying that God the Son has now been 
transmuted into a creaturely human nature; rather, the second person of the Trinity is 
unified in one hypostatic union having both a human and divine nature. This union is 
indivisible. The divine nature does not cease being truly divine and in like manner the 
human nature remains truly human; yet, the two are found in one person. What we see 
taking place here in the Word‘s ―becoming flesh‖ is the divine, second person of the 
Trinity, acquires flesh, i.e., takes on a human nature. Notice John‘s language. When he 
claims the Word ―dwelt among us,‖ it was not just the human nature that dwelt among 
the Jews in Palestine in A.D. 33; rather it was one, undivided and united divine person. 
This becomes clear as John selectively demonstrates the transition from the  ―with 
God‖ from the beginning to the same Who dwells among men. When John uses 
the word dwelt (it would have reminded the Jews of how the LORD dwelt 
among His covenant people in the wilderness.  As Millard Erickson conveys, ―[t]he term 
is a strong one, which literally means ‗tabernacled among us‘ or ‗pitched his tent among 
us.‘ It conveys the idea of a lengthy period of residence rather than a temporary visit.‖113  
Also, we find Paul using language in Colossians 1:19 and 2:9, similar to the way 
John speaks of the incarnation in John 1:14. In Colossians 1:19 Paul goes on to say that, 
in Jesus, (all the fullness dwells), but the passage does not 
provide a subject of the above statement that directly answers ―fullness of what‖?114 In 
order to clarify what Paul is stating the NAS provides the word ―Father‖ while the NIV 
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uses ―God‖ as the subject. Because of the ambiguity of the grammar, some have retorted 
that it becomes hard to determine to whom or what refers. But as N. T. Wright 
points out, v. 20 explains v. 19. It was in and through Christ‘s incarnation that God 
reconciles ―all things to Himself‖ (similar to what Paul claims in I Corinthians 5:19). 115  
 Despite the ambiguity of Colossians 1:19, it can be clarified by comparing it, in 
the larger context, with Colossians 2:9: 
. In this passage, Paul is more specific and is likely referring 
back to what he wrote in 1:19. The two verses are almost identical except for 1:19 
includes the word while the words are left out. 
Clearly Christ is the referent of ―that in Him‖ () and ―fullness‖ (is 
the subject of dwells (. But how should we understand ? Usually 
takes the idea of ―that which has been completed, fullness,‖116 and could focus 
on either ―the process of being filled or the fact of being filled.‖117  Paul qualifies 
 by ―all‖ ( and then quantifies it by ―Deity‖ (.  
 is a genitive which stresses the ―content‖ of the ―head noun,‖ hence, in v. 
9; the content of the ―fullness‖ is ―Deity.‖118 Colossians 2:9 is the only occurrence of 
 in the New Testament and should be distinguished from  (see Rom. 
1:20). Of the two,  is the stronger and refers to the divine nature rather than 
                                                 
 
115
 N. T. Wright, Colossians and Philemon: Tyndale New Testament Commentaries, ed. Leon 
Morris (first published 1986, Leicester: InterVarsity Press; reprint Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 75.  
 
 
116
 Reinier Schippers, ―,‖ in The New International Dictionary of New Testament 
Theology, Vol 1, gen. ed. Colin Brown (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1986), 733. 
 
 
117
 Ibid., 735. 
 
 
118
 A ―genitive of content‖ is a noun or adjective which amplifies the head noun, which is usually 
qualitative. Daniel Wallace stress that ―The nominal genitive of content is distinct from the genitive of 
material in that content indicates the item contained while material indicates the material made out of.‖ 
(Daniel Wallace, Beyond the Basics, 92).  
 
71 
 
merely divine virtues.
119
 Thus the ―fullness of Deity‖ refers to the fact that 
‗completeness‘ or ‗fullness‘ of God‘s nature ―dwells‖ ( in ―bodily form‖ 
in Christ. Wright explains; 
 The word translated ‗in bodily form‘ can also mean ‗actually‘ or ‗in solid reality‘. We should 
not, however, drive a wedge between the two. Part of Paul‘s point is that the incarnation, the 
taking of ‗bodily‘ form by God, was and is the ‗solid reality‘ in which were fulfilled…all the 
ancient promises that God would dwell with his people…[and] he is the embodiment and 
full expression of the one God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.
120
 
 
Similarly, James Dunn argues that: 
 [t]he latter addition, , reinforces the encounterable reality of the indwelling: as 
the human  is what enables a person to be in relationship with other persons, so the 
somatic character of this indwelling meant that God could be encountered directly in and 
through this particular human being, Christ.
121
 
  
 Thus what one can draw from John 1:14 and Colossians 2:9 is that God the Son 
entered space-time in a unique and particular way in and through the incarnation. When 
Scripture speaks of the Word‘s ―becoming flesh‖ and ―dwelling‖ among us, it is hard to 
see how God the Son could remain timeless by virtue of His entering into space-time, 
since timelessness means being devoid of any succession or movement and having no 
temporal or spatial extension or location. Further, it is hard to see how the language used 
here by Scripture to speak of God the Son ―becoming flesh‖ and ‗dwelling‖ could be 
anthropomorphic. For eternalism, any mention in Scripture of God‘s changing in His 
actions or responding to prayer is metaphorical. Yet, Scripture affirms that the Word 
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dwelt among us, i.e., He entered into our space-time universe in the person of Jesus 
Christ   
 
The Incarnation and Nicene Christianity 
 The Nicene Creed states that God the Father is ―the Maker of all things visible  
and invisible.‖122 This demonstrates, as Thomas Torrance points out, that ―visible‖ and  
―invisible‖ are references to creation ex nihilo and that such language in the creed 
demonstrates that God, as the maker of heaven and earth is transcendent.
123
 When the 
creed proclaims that the Word was ―of the substance ( of the 
Father.  This literally means that the Son and the Father are ―sharing one being.‖124 The 
next part of the Creed we are concerned with is ―came down and was made flesh, and 
became man.‖125 When it refers to the Son ―coming down,‖ this does not imply that the 
Son travels through space to get to earth; rather, in becoming man this speaks of God‘s 
―pure condescension.‖126 Torrance reminds us that we should not understand the Son‘s 
entering into space-time as in some way an ―imperfection‖ nor should we think of it as 
the Son somehow became conditioned by space; rather, through His self-condescension 
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the Son of God‘s presence was actually here in space-time. Yet, He remained of the same 
substance with the Father.
127 
 At Chalcedon, the Fathers established some clear boundaries concerning the 
incarnation. The Creed of Chalcedon recognized that in the incarnation of the Son of God 
there exist two distinct natures. In this case, there is a divine nature which includes those 
properties that make a person divine, and, a human nature which includes those 
properties that make a person human. A second element is that the two natures exist in 
one ‗hypostatic‘ union. In this union, neither nature is ―annulled.‖ The two natures 
remain distinct in the union, yet joined together to form one person. It is not as if the two 
natures were blended to form some kind of hybrid; rather, the two natures are indivisible 
from one another, i.e., they cannot separate. Thus Chalcedon ―recognized IN TWO 
NATURES, WITHOUT CONFUSION, WITHOUT CHANGE, WITHOUT DIVISION, 
WITHOUT SEPERATION.‖ 128 But what does the Chalcedonian definition mean when it 
claims that the two natures are ―without change?‖ Does this mean that God is without 
change in any sense?
129
 Such a strict interpretation does not seem to be the case. Thomas 
Torrance explains: 
 Now the doctrine of the immutability and impassibility of God as we find it in the patristic 
theology is ambiguous. It means that God is not moved by, and is not changed by, anything 
outside himself, and that he is not affected by anything or does not suffer form anything 
beyond himself. In this sense the immutability and impassibility of God refer to the eternal 
tranquility and serenity of God in his transcendence over all the changes and chances, all the 
pain and violence, of our world. But it does not mean that God does not move himself and is 
incapable of imparting motion to what he has made. It does not mean that God in himself is 
devoid of passion, devoid of love, or devoid of mercy, that he is impassibly and immutably 
related to our world of space and time in such a way that it is thrown back upon itself as a 
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closed continuum of cause and effect. I grant that patristic theology was tempted constantly 
by the thrust of Greek thought to change the concepts of impassibility and immutability in 
this direction, but it remained entrenched within the orbit of Judeo-Christian doctrine of the 
living God who moves himself, who through free love created the universe, imparting to its 
dynamic order, and who through the outgoing of his love moves outside of himself in the 
incarnation.
130
 
 
There is no doubt that early Fathers believed that God was eternal and immutable; 
however, as Torrance pointed out in the above passage, they did not construe those 
attributes in such a way that God could not enter into space-time. Much of what drove 
Athanasius and the early Christians was soteriology. Anything less than divine could not 
provide adequate atonement for sin.
 131
  For this reason the Word became flesh: 
 that you may know that the reason of His coming down was because of us, and that our 
transgression called forth the loving-kindness of the Word, that the Lord should both make 
haste to help us and appearing among men. For of His becoming Incarnate we were the 
object, and for our salvation He dealt so lovingly as to appear and be born even in human 
body.
132
   
 
Also, Athanasius explains that the ―incorporeal and incorruptible and immaterial Word of 
God comes into our realm.‖133 Such a concept of God entering into the world was in no 
way impossible for Athanasius. Even before the incarnation God‘s presence filled the 
universe. Through the incarnation, though, God entered into creation in a new way, 
coming ―in condescension to shew loving-kindness upon us, and to visit us.‖134 Through 
the Word‘s becoming flesh, He accomplished two things. First, was to rid us of death by 
giving us new life, and, second, to make Himself known, i.e., the invisible became  
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visible.
135
 Thus, Athanasius asserts: 
 For He was not, as might be imagined, circumscribed in the body, nor, while present in the 
body, was He absent elsewhere; nor while He moved the body, was the universe left void of 
His working and Providence; but, thing most marvelous, Word as He was, so far from being 
contained by anything, He rather contained all things Himself; and just as while present in 
the whole of Creation, He is at once distinct in being from the universe, and present in all 
things by His own power—giving order to all things, and over all and in all revealing His 
own providence, and giving life to each thing and all things, including the whole without 
being included, but being in His own Father alone wholly and in every respect.
136
  
 
Athanasius‘ understanding of the incarnation provides some powerful insights to our 
discussion on time and space. Here we see that God the Son was present within the 
world, moving and operating within the world, and yet He was not in any way bound by 
it. Also, Athanasius claims that while the Son‘s presence is everywhere within the created 
realm, He remains distinct from it. Similarly, it is argued in the Tome of Leo:  
 because being invisible in His own nature, He became visible in ours, and He whom nothing 
could contain was content to be contained: abiding before all time He began to be in time: 
the LORD of all things, He obscured His immeasurable majesty and took on Him the form 
of a servant: being God that cannot suffer, He did not disdain to be man that can, and, 
immortal as He is, to subject Himself to the laws of death. 
137
 
 
In becoming flesh, the Son remained what He was, yet, He entered into space-time, 
taking on the form of a servant, and as invisible God, become visible to us (Col 1:15).   
 What we can conclude from the above discussion is that the early Church was 
concerned more with whether or not, in the incarnation, the Son of God would have 
ceased being God. The driving factor behind the early Church, particularly with 
Athanasius, was whether anything less than divine could provide adequate atonement for 
sin. However, if God the Son changed in His nature through the incarnation, then He 
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would no longer be God and there could be no salvation. In the same manner, if he were 
not truly man, then there could be no atonement. Nevertheless, the early Church held that 
God the Son truly entered into space-time and yet, by doing so, He did not alter His 
divine nature. Therefore, the divine eternal nature must be such that entering into space-
time could be possible. He was not bound by doing so, yet He remained transcendent and 
eternal with the Father in one substance ().138   
 
A Philosophical Argument for the Son’s Temporality 
 What has been agued thus far is that Scripture speaks of the Son of God as 
temporal. The language used by John and Paul is the strongest language possible to 
demonstrate that the Son of God entered into space-time. The Word truly ―dwelt‖ among 
us. Further, the language used by the early Church Fathers included the concept of God 
the Son entering into our space-time. The Son had to become like us in our humanity 
(apart from sin) in every way in order for us to have salvation (Heb 4:15). Yet, the 
Father‘s rejected any notion that, in becoming flesh, the divine Word, the Son of God, 
ceased being divine by His entering into space-time. Thus whatever it means for the 
divine nature to be eternal, it must include the possibility for God the Son to enter into 
space-time. Given that scripture and the early Church thought that the Son of God entered 
into space-time, we shall now examine an argument by Thomas Senor for the temporality 
of the Son of God:  
 P1) Jesus Christ read in the synagogue (at the start of His ministry) 
 C1) So, temporal predicates apply to Jesus Christ 
 P2) Jesus Christ = God the Son 
 C2) So, temporal predicates apply to God the Son 
 P3) Temporal predicates don‘t apply to timeless beings 
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 C3) So, God the Son isn‘t timeless139 
 
If the above argument is correct, then it raises the obvious difficulty: If the first and third 
persons of the Trinity are timeless, then how could the second person be temporal. As 
Garrett DeWeese puts it, while ―this does not prove that God is temporal, it does make 
atemporality look suspect.‖140 
 Brian Leftow objects to Senor‘s argument. He thinks that Senor‘s argument rests 
on the faulty assumption that God the Son could not be timelessly incarnate. Let us 
suppose that the person of Jesus consists of S(soul) + B(body) + Son of God. Now, in 
order for the Son of God to be human, then it would require the whole, i.e. S + B + Son 
of God to exist. According to Leftow, the Son of God is the first part of the whole, much 
like the first brick of a wall. While the first brick is not the whole of the wall, 
nevertheless, it is a part of it. Now, if the rest of the wall were never built, claims Leftow, 
then one brick which had been laid would be enough for an individual to think that it is 
the first part of the wall, simply because the solitary brick represents the builder‘s intent 
behind building the wall. How does this translate into our discussion on the incarnation? 
If the Son is part of the whole, i.e. S + B + Son of God, then it is proper to call the Son 
human, even though S + B do not appear until 4 BC. For, it is in God‘s intentions that the 
Son of God be joined to S + B, therefore, timelessly God intends for the Son to be united 
with S + B. Since it was in God‘s intentions timelessly for the Son of God to be united 
with S + B, then any change occurs only in temporal things, and not in God.
141
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 The problem with Leftow‘s argument is, as Garrett DeWeese points out, this 
―response [S + B + Son of God] puts Leftow in the position of arguing that the timeless 
Son stands in a unifying causal relation with the temporal parts S+B such that a substance 
(the Son+S+B) with both timeless and temporal parts results.‖142 As previously 
demonstrated, the very notion of atemporal causation and atemporal sustaining is a 
difficult one (provided that the A-theory of time is true). It seems that in order for God to 
sustain a temporal universe, or any temporal thing, God would become temporal by 
virtue of His sustaining it. Further, how can the divine nature be united with the human 
nature, yet without somehow being affected by the temporality of the human nature? On 
this point, even Leftow admits this raises a problem ―Just what relations God has to S + B 
in virtue of the incarnate—taking on flesh . . . Certainly God has certain thoughts and 
sensations due to this which he would not have had otherwise.‖143 Leftow‘s solution is to 
argue that the Son always, timelessly, had these thoughts and experiences, and any 
―relations‖ that the timeless Son of God has to these events are causal and not 
temporal.
144
 But again, this leads back to the problem of atemporal causation and 
sustaining. Leftow does not think that causal relations are temporal, but as was 
demonstrated earlier, if each individual event is sustained by God, then it is hard to see 
how God remains atemporal by virtue of His sustaining temporal events. Let us suppose 
that the Son timelessly exists apart from S + B, then at t1, in our space-time universe, the 
Son exists united to S + B. At t1 we can claim: ―The Son is united to S + B.‖ But this 
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could also be said of times t2, t3, t4, and so on. Thus the Son is united to S + B through a 
series of temporal events. Now, if the Son part is atemporal (meaning: a mode of 
existence apart from any temporal succession) and the S + B parts are temporal (meaning: 
a mode of existence with temporal succession), how could it be said that the Son is united 
to S + B. Suppose the defender of divine timelessness claims that the Son‘s uniting with 
the S + B in Jesus Christ is, in fact, God‘s eternally willing that certain actions, thoughts, 
and intentions A,  B,  C,  D. . . be displayed through S + B at certain times t1, t2, t3, t4 . . .  
But this does not seem to help the eternalist either. For, if that were the case, it would 
seem that something like Adoptionism is taking place, i.e., that S + B was chosen by God 
as His Son and to display certain ―God-like‖ qualities within the world.   
 Let us turn now to a second objection to Leftow‘s argument. To the defender of 
the ―composite account‖, 145 Senor poses the following question: Is Jesus Christ identical 
to God the Son? Classical Christianity would say ―yes‖, but could Leftow say that Jesus 
Christ is identical to God the Son? It would seem not. According to Leftow, the S + B of 
Jesus Christ could have constituted a person had the Son not joined with the S + B. But 
since the Son joined with S + B at conception, then, the sum of the Son, S, and B form a 
―larger person‖.146 Senor finds Leftow‘s solution problematic. He explains: 
 And herein is a significant problem for the CA: it must, in the end, deny this, i.e., Jesus 
Christ and God the Son are identical. Recall that JC, is a composite consisting of GS, and 
the human body and mind assumed in the incarnation. So if GS is but a proper part of the 
individual who is Jesus Christ, then the friend of the CA is committed to saying that GS and 
JC are not identical.
147
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Further, 
 . . . the fact that the CA is committed to JC‘s not being a person falls out of what Leftow 
says earlier when he claims that no natural kind can have a member of that same natural kind 
as a proper part. . . . But Leftow thinks that persons are natural kinds. Thus, if GS is a person 
(and surely that is nonnegotiable) then either JC is not a person or GS isn‘t part of JC.148 
 
Since, according to Leftow, God the Son is a proper part of the composite Jesus Christ 
[Son + S + B], the two cannot be identical. However, as Senor points out, no one would 
deny that God the Son is a person. Therefore, such a view, insists Senor, leads to one of 
two consequences: that ―either Nestorianism is true and there are two persons in the 
incarnation, or God Incarnate – Jesus Christ – is not a person.‖149 Which, both are to be 
rejected on pain of heresy.  
 One other possible out for the eternalist is to suggest that the Son has always been 
incarnate. This seems to be the position advocated by Eleoenore Stump and Norman 
Kretzmann and by Paul Helm. In defending the doctrine of divine timelessness, Stump 
and Kretzmann recognize the difficulty of the incarnation and suggest: 
 The divine nature of the second person of the Trinity, like the divine nature of either of the 
other persons of the Trinity, cannot become temporal; nor could the second person at some 
time acquire a human nature he does not eternally have. Instead, the second person eternally 
has two natures….150 
 
But what exactly do they mean by saying that the Son of God ―eternally has two 
natures‖? Stump and Kretzmann could be taken two ways, here. First, they could mean 
that the Son of God never assumed a human nature, i.e., he has had the human nature 
eternally. But this would be unorthodox. The second way to take Stump and Kretzmann 
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is to understand them meaning that the Son did not assume ―a human nature at some 
time.‖151 Similarly to Stump and Kretzmann, Paul Helm makes the following argument: 
 One thing to note is that if God the Son is timelessly eternal and yet incarnate in Jesus 
Christ, there is no time in his existence when he was not incarnate, though since he became 
incarnate at a particular time in our history there were times in that history before the 
incarnation, and times since . . . . The incarnation is the ―projection‖ of the eternal God. 
There is therefore no sense in talking of the eternal Son of God apart from the incarnation 
except to make the point that the incarnation was logically contingent. That is, there is no 
point to it if by this we mean there was a time when the eternal Son of God existed 
unincarnated. It is of course possible for us to think of the eternal Son of God as 
unincarnated, by an abstraction thought, but that is a different matter. The point is….there is 
no preexistent Christ with a life history independent of and prior to the incarnation. There 
was no time when the eternal God was not Jesus of Nazareth . . . .The Son of God is 
conceptually or ontologically prior to the incarnate Jesus, but not temporally prior. He is 
conceptually prior because being the Son of God he is not created, and he took our flesh, in 
just the same way in which, though there was not time when the creation was not, God 
eternally willed the universe, and hence is logically and ontologically prior to the universe.
152
   
 
In both cases, what is being argued for is that the divine nature is somehow timelessly, or 
perhaps, tenselessly united to the human nature. But this is problematic. In order for the 
timeless Son of God to be tenselessly united to the human nature, one would have to 
appeal to a B-theory of time. As was pointed out, there are some major theological and 
philosophical reasons for rejecting the B-theory. But let us examine this notion further. 
Suppose one adopts the B-theory as a possible way out for eternalism, how would such a 
view fit with the Christian doctrines of redemption and eternal life?  
 The apostle Paul tells us in Romans 8 that not only are human beings going to be 
redeemed, but all of creation, i.e., a kind of cosmic redemption. 
 For the anxious longing of the creation waits eagerly for the revealing of the sons of 
God. For the creation was subjected to futility, not willingly but because of Him who 
subjected it, in hope that the creation itself also will be  set free from its slavery to 
corruption into the freedom of the glory of the children of God. For we know that the 
whole creation groans and suffers the pains of childbirth together until now. And not 
only this, but also we ourselves, having the first fruits of the Spirit, even we 
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ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting eagerly for our adoption as sons, the 
redemption of our body. (Rom 8:19-23) 
 
Similarly, in Colossians 1:20, Paul encourages us with the fact that it is through Christ 
that ―all things‖ will be reconciled to God. However, if the B-theory of time is correct, 
will creation ever have freedom from the effects of evil? Does Christ ever triumph over 
the power of death and of sin? William Lane Craig forcefully demonstrates that if the B-
theory is true then evil is never properly dealt with: 
 On the static theory of time, evil is never really vanquished from the world: It exists 
just as sturdily as ever at its various locations in space-time, even if those locations 
are all earlier than some point in cosmic time (for example, Judgment Day). Creation 
is never really purged of evil on this view; at most it can be said that evil only infects 
those parts of creation which are earlier than certain other events. But the stain is 
indelible. What this implies for events such as the crucifixion and resurrection of 
Christ is very troubling. In a sense Christ hangs permanently on the cross, for the 
dreadful events of A.D. 30 never fade away or transpire. The victory of the 
resurrection becomes a hollow triumph, for the spatio-temporal parts of Jesus that 
were crucified and buried remain dying and dead and are never raised to new life.
153
    
 
Such a picture of Christ‘s redemptive work takes away the significance of Christ‘s dying 
―once for all‖ on behalf of our sin (Heb 9:12; 28). 
 Further, scripture speaks of believers as living forever. But if the universe exists 
as a four-dimensional space-time solid, then how are we to understand the biblical 
teaching of eternal life? If all events exist as earlier than and later than relations, then my 
living in a glorified state exists equally as real as my living in a non-redemptive state.   
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the doctrines of creation and incarnation provide strong objections 
to divine timelessness. Further, we have defined immutability in light of scripture and of 
some recent treatments of the doctrine, such that, God does not change in His essence, 
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character, plan or purposes.  Equally important, scripture affirms that God changes in His 
activity and His relationships toward His creatures. But if God changes in his activity and 
in His relationships, then He would be temporal in some sense. For, an absolutely 
changeless and timeless being could not act in the world, nor could He change in His 
relationships toward His creatures. But how are we to understand God‘s temporality? 
What does it mean to say that God is ―in time?‖ Moreover, if God is in time, would He 
not be akin to the God of Process or Open Theism?   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
OMNITEMPORALITY AS GOD’S TEMPORAL  
MODE OF EXISTENCE 
 
 
 
 In chapter one an exposition was given of Paul Helm‘s defense of the medieval 
notion of divine timelessness. For Helm, such a doctrine rests on the intuition of divine 
fullness and absolute immutability. But as was shown in chapter two, based on the 
impossibility of God‘s sustaining a temporal universe without Himself becoming 
temporal and on the argument that in the incarnation, God the Son entered into space-
time, there is reason to call into question eternalism‘s use of absolute immutability to 
support divine timelessness. In this chapter we shall focus on presenting a coherent 
understanding of God‘s temporal mode of existence. The first part of this chapter will 
demonstrate that the temporalist can maintain a balance between the classical Christian 
doctrines of transcendence and immanence. The second part will examine two models of 
divine temporality, offering a synthesis approach to understanding God‘s temporal mode 
of existence.   
 
Temporalism: A Balance between Transcendence and Immanence 
 
 Any theory on the doctrine of God must take into consideration Scripture‘s 
teaching on God‘s transcendence and immanence. Transcendence means that God is 
―other‖ than this world. He is the creator of all that exists and everything that exists finds 
its being and existence in, by, for and through Him (Gen 1:1; Isa 44: 24; John 1:3; Rom 
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4:17; Col 1:15-17; Heb 11:3). He is not bound by the world in any temporal or spatial 
kind of way; rather, he exists ontologically outside of created space-time. Further, He is 
beyond creation in His holiness, knowledge and His moral character (Isa 6:1, 3; 46: 9-10; 
58:8-9; 1 Cor 1:25). On the other hand, Scripture speaks of God as immanently involved 
with the world. This does not mean, as in Process theology, that God is somehow 
enmeshed in processes of the world; instead, Scripture speaks of God acting in and caring 
for the world (Ex 20: 1; Matt 5:45; 6:26-30; Acts 17:27-28).  
 There are some passages which speak of both God‘s immanence and 
transcendence. For instance, Paul‘s address to the Athenians on Mars Hill stresses that 
God is the creator of everything. He is not bound to any physical location, yet He is the 
one who gives life to men. Further, He wants men to seek after Him, since ―He is not far 
from each one of us‖ (Acts 17:22-28). Another passage which speaks to both God‘s 
immanence and transcendence is Isaiah 57:15. In this passage Isaiah writes: ―For thus 
says the high and exalted One Who lives forever, whose name is Holy, ‗I dwell [on] a 
high and holy place, And [also] with the contrite and lowly of spirit . . .‘‖ Thus it is clear 
that Scripture speaks of both God‘s transcendence and immanence. In what follows is an 
attempt to demonstrate a balance between God‘s transcendence and immanence.   
  
Temporalism and God ―in‖ Created Space-time? 
 
 One common misconception argued for by the eternalist is that God ―in‖ time is a 
contradiction. Similarly, if God is in time, could it not be said of God that He is ―in‖ 
space as well. We shall examine, first, the argument that God is ―in‖ time. It would seem 
that if this argument fails, then so too would the argument that God is in space. But 
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before moving to the first argument it is important to distinguish between ―kinds‖ of 
time.  
 Unfortunately, many philosophical theologians develop their theory of God‘s 
temporal mode of existence ever before considering what time is. When contemplating 
the notion of time, it is important to distinguish between kinds of time. For instance, as 
noted earlier, there is a difference between an A-series of time events and a B-series of 
time events. These two views lead to two quite different outlooks on the nature of reality. 
But these are not the only distinctions that can be made. The philosophical theologian can 
distinguish between at least four ―kinds‖ of time: Psychological time; Physical time; 
Cosmic time; and Metaphysical time. Each of these distinctions shall be examined 
below.
1
  
 First, psychological time refers to a kind of time that is consciously experienced 
by an individual. Each person has her own psychological time, yet, it seems that whether 
an event passes quickly or slowly, the arriving at the end of the event indicates that 
psychological time is grounded in an objective time outside of the individual. Second, by 
physical time, philosophers of time mean a kind of time that can be measured by clocks. 
To put it differently ―‘Physical‘ or ‗clock time‘ refers to time in any temporal world 
where laws of nature allow for the measurement of time with some physical clock. This is 
possible only if the laws of nature in the world allow for regular physical processes that 
from the basis of the operation of the clock.‖2 The third kind of time is cosmic time. 
Unlike physical time, where time is limited to local reference frames, cosmic time refers 
to the measurement of the duration of the whole universe. Fourth, and lastly, is 
                                                 
 
1
 Garrett DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, p. 9-10.  
  
 
2
 Ibid., 9. 
87 
 
metaphysical time. This is what some philosophers of time call God‘s time. If God has 
any ―succession‖ or ―duration‖ to His life, then this would properly be called 
metaphysical time. Metaphysical time should not be confused with physical time or 
cosmic time, which requires physical laws and physical processes. Rather, metaphysical 
time is unique to God. It is God‘s own time.3     
 Now that some proper distinctions have been made between kinds of time, we 
shall now turn to the first argument made by the eternalist, that God ―in‖ time is a 
contradiction. The argument goes something to the effect: Temporalists want to argue 
that God created time, yet God is within time. Such a statement seems contradictory. 
Either God came into existence with time or time has always existed. If God created time 
then He is not a necessary being, since He would have begun to exist with time. On the 
other hand, if the later is true, then it would seem that God is dependent on something 
other than Himself for His own existence. Either way, God‘s necessary existence is 
denied.  
 But this kind of argument is a strawman argument against the temporalist view. 
Temporalists want to make a distinction between God‘s own time, which is metaphysical 
time, and created physical time. As Garret DeWeese notes:   
 Stating that an entity is metaphysically temporal is to say that it is a temporal entity, but the 
temporal properties and relations that belong to it are defined with reference to metaphysical 
and not physical time. What constitutes metaphysical temporality is the same relation and 
constitutes any other temporality: causation. My suggestion is that the causal succession of 
mental states in God‘s conscious life grounds the flow and direction of metaphysical time. 
And, given that God is creator and sustainer of the contingent order, his causal sustenance of 
every world will ground the time of that world
4
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God does not exist ―in‖ created, contingent physical time; rather He has his own 
metaphysical time, which is grounded in and flows from His own ―conscious life.‖ 
Further, God as Creator and Sustainer of the physical world order brings about the entire 
space-time ordered-ness by His own causal power. Thus to say that God has His own 
time is not the same as saying that God is ―in‖ created time.     
 Further, why think that God is in created space anymore than He is in created 
time. Scripture affirms that God is omnipresent. For instance, the prophet Jeremiah wrote 
―‗Am I a God who is near,‘ declares the Lord, ‗And not a God far off? ‗Can a man hide 
himself in hiding places, So I do not see him?‘ declares the Lord. ‗Do I not fill the 
heavens and the earth?‘ declares the Lord.‖(Jer 23:23-24) Similarly, David, when 
speaking of God‘s presence, wrote in Ps 139:7-13:  
 Where can I go from Thy Spirit? Or where can I flee from Thy presence?  If I ascend to 
heaven, Thou art there; If I make my bed in Sheol, behold, Thou art there. If I take the wings 
of the dawn, If I dwell in the remotest part of the sea, Even there Thy hand will lead me, And 
Thy right hand will lay hold of me. If I say, "Surely the darkness will overwhelm me, And 
the light around me will be night," Even the darkness is not dark to Thee, And the night is as 
bright as the day. Darkness and light are alike [to Thee.] For Thou didst form my inward 
parts; Thou didst weave me in my mother's womb. 
 
But these biblical passages on God‘s omnipresence do not require that God exist in 
created space-time; rather, God‘s omnipresence means that God, in the fullness of His 
being, is present at every place of the created order, not in the sense that God somehow 
permeates or embodies space-time, as in pantheism or panentheism, but in the sense that 
He is aware of what is going on in the created order and that He is actively present by 
sustaining and acting within creation to bring about His own will and purposes.
5
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Temporalism, Immutability and Divine Act 
 
 Scripture often speaks of God performing certain actions. But as was pointed out, 
for the eternalist, any reference in scripture which speaks of God acting in time should be 
taken metaphorically. But why think that every instance in Scripture which speaks of God 
acting in the universe is metaphor or anthropomorphic. Against this position, John 
Feinberg raises the objection: 
 What is the evidence that these passages are anthropomorphic? Moreover, what are the 
criteria for determining that we are dealing with anthropomorphisms? We need answers that 
admit that some language about God is anthropomorphic and some is not. What 
Atemporalists must do to discredit the temporalist‘s biblical evidence is explain what criteria 
tell them the language is anthropomorphic. No doubt that some will reply that if God is an 
immaterial being, he doesn‘t have a literal voice box with which to speak, nor can he lead 
Israel out of Egypt with a literal hand, because he has none. Both temporalists and 
Atemporalists would agree that such language is anthropomorphic or metaphorical, but the 
temporalists should add, don‘t be confused by the ―surface grammar‖ of these sentences. 
God cannot lead Israel out of Egypt with a literal hand, but don‘t think that means God can‘t 
do the act at all. God is acting, and temporalists want to know how God can know when to 
act at the right time, if God is atemporal.
6
 
 
 As Nicholas Wolterstorff suggests, the burden of proof is on the eternalist to show that 
such actions are indeed metaphorical: 
 Scripture pervasively represents God as having a history of action, knowledge and response. 
The eternalist argues that Scripture‘s representation of God as having a history must not be 
taken as literally true. The person who accepts Scripture as canonical will concede, in 
advance, that the eternalist might just possibly have good reason for this view; after all, 
everybody who accepts Scripture as canonical thinks that certain aspects of how Scripture 
represents God should not be taken as literally true. However, the burden of proof lies on the 
eternalist; in general it‘s the case, if one takes Scripture as canonical, that the burden of 
proof lies on the person who holds that in some particular respect Scripture‘s representation 
of God is not to be taken as literally true.
7
  
 
Scripture affirms that God has a history, and this is no more clearly seen than in life of 
Jesus. According to Wolterstorff, any consideration on the doctrine of divine action must 
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take into consideration that the Second Person of the trinity, the divine Son of God, 
―became flesh.‖8  
 The actions of Jesus were not simply human actions brought about by God, plus human 
actions freely performed by Jesus in situations brought about by God; they were God‘s 
actions. In the life and deeds of Jesus it was God who dwelt among us. The narrative of the 
history of Jesus is not just a narrative concerning events in the history of the relationship of a 
human being to God; it‘s a narrative about God. God does have a history; the doctrine of the 
incarnation implies that the history of Jesus is the history of God.
9
  
 
Moreover, if we are to seriously take into consideration that in the incarnation God the 
Son entered into our space-time existence, ―becoming flesh‖ and ―dwelling‖ among us, 
then God‘s own temporal mode of existence must be such that He can enter into our 
space-time universe without somehow becoming enmeshed with it. Thomas Torrance 
describes the event of the incarnation, whereby God enters into created space-time, as the 
forging of a ―deeper ontological bond‖ between God‘s ―uncreated time and created 
time‖10 Torrance goes on to say, ―we think of the eternal time of God incarnate as 
penetrating and embracing the contingent time of our creaturely world thereby giving it 
features which it does not have merely in virtue of its creaturely nature.‖11 Notice 
Torrance‘s language, here. He is not saying that God‘s uncreated time, which is God‘s 
eternity, becomes our created time or that the two times are mutated into one time; rather, 
there is a bond forged between the two distinct, but not dissimilar, times. As was pointed 
out in chapter two, God the Son‘s entering into space-time is central for our redemption, 
and not only for human creaturely redemption, but for the entire created contingent 
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universe. But if God‘s eternality means, as eternalism suggests, that God is atemporal, 
then it seems impossible for God to enter into space-time, for an absolutely timeless God 
can experience no temporal succession in His life nor can He have any temporal or 
spatial extension. Therefore, temporalism makes better sense when considering the 
Christian doctrine of the incarnation. 
 
Temporalism and Changing Knowledge 
 
 As was demonstrated earlier, a defender of divine timelessness, in order maintain 
her position, would have to acknowledge that God could not know ―now‖ what is taking 
place in the universe.
12
 A timeless God would be limited to tenseless truths. But could not 
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temporal reference frame. Because there are no privileged observers, then we can see here that what God 
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  However, there are numerous difficulties with Stump and Kretzmann‘s view of  ET-simultaneity. 
The fundamental problem is how a temporal event can ―be wholly present‖ to a being that has all of its life. 
(Helm, Eternal God, 33)  Also, Stump and Kretzmann equivocate on the word present. While God 
experiences a ―‗present-like‘ existences,‖ His present radically differs from our own, in that, it is atemporal 
and not in any way part of our own temporal system. (Alan G. Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature of 
Time, 69.) One other problem that arises is that for God to know now what is occurring in the universe 
would render Him as temporal because God‘s consciousness would change from event to event. (John 
Feinberg, No One Like Him, 412.)  
 Brian Leftow attempts to salvage Stump and Kretzmann‘s ET-simultaneity by promoting his own 
theory of simultaneity. There are two basic prongs to Leftow‘s view. First, he suggests that temporal 
objects somehow exists paradoxically both temporally and eternally. The second part to Leftow‘s theory is  
what he calls, the ―Zero Thesis.‖ The Zero Thesis proposes that because God is spaceless, there is no 
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the eternalist turn the above argument around and argue that a temporal God could not be 
omniscient because, being temporal necessitates God‘s knowledge of certain facts 
changing and that if God‘s knowledge of facts changes, He could not be omniscient?  
What shall be argued below is that the eternalist has made an equivocation on the word 
knowledge. Perhaps we can make a distinction between kinds of knowledge? But before 
going on, the question remains whether a Christian theist can reconcile temporalism with 
divine foreknowledge? One could elude the divine temporal-foreknowledge problem by 
endorsing middle knowledge.
13
 Helm rejects middle knowledge as a way to reconcile 
temporalism and divine foreknowledge because, given the nature of indeterministically 
freewill, there could be no future counterfactuals.
14
 He concurs with William Hasker that 
if God does not determine the future then ―God‘s omniscience is limited by what is 
knowable. If Jones is indeterministically free, then it is not knowable, either to God or to 
us or to any other observer, what Jones will do when, in a given set of circumstances, he 
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is confronted with a choice.‖15 But Helm‘s objection rests on the faulty assumption that 
all proponents of middle knowledge are libertarians.
16
 Could one not be a compatabilist  
and yet adhere to middle knowledge? 
 John Feinberg, points out that scripture portrays God as ―deciding to create,‖ 
which was worked out in accordance with the counsel of God‘s will.17  
 But, wouldn‘t God foreknow that he would create and foreknow which world it would be? 
As already stated, divine omniscience means, among other things, that God only knows what 
can be known. Until God decided to create and chose to actualize a particular possible world, 
there was nothing to know about whether and what he would create. Does this mean that 
once God made the decision, he came to know something he hadn‘t known before? Yes, but 
this is only damaging to omniscience and immutability if what he came to know was 
information available before he came to know it. God could be aware of all the possibilities 
open to him in advance of choosing any of them, but until he decided to create a world and 
which one to create, he could not know whether he would create, and if he would, which 
possible world he would create.
18
 
 
So, if God has middle knowledge, then it seems that He has all possibilities available to 
His knowledge. Before God‘s decision to create; however, as Feinberg recognizes, there 
was nothing to foreknow. It is only when God decides to create that He gains 
foreknowledge of what will become actualized. Feinberg‘s discussion on middle 
knowledge will aid what follows in making a distinction between types of knowledge.   
 In considering types of knowledge we can make a distinction between ―content‖ 
and ―relational‖ kinds of knowledge. If omniscience is an essential property for God to 
                                                 
 
15
 Ibid., 61. 
 
 
16
 Ibid., 67; Here, we shall concede to Helm‘s point that if humans are indeterministically free, 
then no one, including God, could know what they might choose. As I noted in chapter two, Helm‘s 
argument rests on the faulty assumption that statements about the future are neither true nor false. For now, 
all we need to show is that there is an alternative view of middle knowledge which is not libertarian in 
nature. For instance, John Feinberg holds to divine middle knowledge and remains, like Helm, a 
compatabilist. The burden of proof is on the eternalists to show that Middle knowledge could not work 
within the compatabilist‘s system. See Feinberg, No One Like Him, 747-742. 
 
 
17
 Feinberg, No One Like Him, 313. 
 
 
18
 Ibid., 113-114.  
94 
 
have, then God is omniscient necessarily. There is no possible world in which God exists 
that He would not be omniscient. Further, the kind of knowledge that God must have in 
all possible worlds, i.e., knowledge that is essential to His being, we can call ―content 
knowledge‖ or ―essential knowledge.‖ The second kind of knowledge is ―relational‖ 
knowledge. By relational knowledge, we are here speaking of a kind of knowledge that is 
contingent. It is contingent because it is knowledge that is non-essential for God to have. 
God could have been happily content prior to creation to exist in intra-Trinitarian 
fellowship. God did not have to create the world that exists, but chose to create it. Now 
the kind of world that God created was not anything new to his content knowledge. For 
instance, we could say that God knows that if He creates World w’, then such a world 
would contain Person p. God also knows that at Time t’ Smith mows his lawn. We can 
concede with an atemporalist that prior to creation God could know all facts tenselessly. 
He knows them essentially. However, when God creates, all that He intends to create 
becomes actualized, and because God‘s creation becomes actualized, the way in which 
God knows the content of His knowledge changes. He has not ceased to know those 
objects which have become actualized; rather, He knows them relationally. Therefore, not 
only can we say that God knows Smith mows His lawn on August 15, 1979 at 5:35 p.m. 
(tenselessly), but we can also say that God knew Smith mowed his lawn on August 15, 
1979 (tensed). God‘s tensed knowledge is contingent and was unnecessary for God to 
have, but, since God has entered into a new relation with creation, all knowledge of the 
temporal world becomes part of God‘s knowledge. An analogy may help to clarify the 
difference between ―content‖ knowledge and ―relational‖ knowledge.  
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 Suppose that Ziggy has the special ability to predict the future. Every time that 
Ziggy experiences a tingling sensation behind his left ear he knows that whatever pops 
into his mind at that particular point will inevitably come true. It is much like 
Spiderman‘s ―spidey sense‖ when danger is lurking around the corner. Let us say that 
Ziggy feels that tingling sensation behind his left ear and immediately a black cat running 
through his hallway pops into his mind. Unbeknown to Ziggy, his wife picked up a stray 
cat and is on the way home. After having the vision, Ziggy decided to take a nap. When 
he wakes up, he walks toward his kitchen and, low and behold, he sees a black cat 
running through his hallway.  
 This analogy is limited because Ziggy, as a finite being has limited knowledge, 
unlike God who has all possibilities available to Him. However, the point of the analogy 
is that something in the mind is completely distinct from that thing being actualized. That 
which is in the mind of God is actualized when God creates. It is not that the content of 
God‘s knowledge has changed nor has those properties that makes God essentially and 
necessarily omniscient have changed, but only that God has entered into a relational 
change with creation in regards to His knowledge. The relational changes that have taken 
place are not forced upon God, rather these relational changes occur from God‘s own free 
choice to create and to actualize the contents of His knowledge and to reveal Himself.   
One other argument which demonstrates that God has contingent knowledge is 
based on Trinitarian fellowship and divine consciousness. If God is timeless, then it 
seems that God could not change in consciousness because to change in consciousness 
would mean that God is temporal. John Feinberg explains: 
 If all members of the Trinity are equally omniscient (and they are), and there is no possibility 
of sequence in what any of them consciously thinks, then all three always have the same 
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thought they have always been thinking and always think exactly what the other two 
members are thinking.
19
 
 
Are there distinctions in God‘s knowledge? Could God the Son know that He is distinct 
from the Father yet one with the Father or that He is distinct from the Spirit and yet one 
with the Spirit? What about the statements in Scripture such as Jesus‘ high priestly prayer 
where Jesus claims: ―[a]nd now glorify Thou Me together with Thyself, Father, with the 
glory which I had with Thee before the world was (John 17:5).‖ We see here that the Son 
has direct awareness of the Father and wants to experience the same glory they shared 
before the world began. Perhaps we can say that God knows the following proposition: in 
30 A.D. the Son incarnate utters a desire to return to His Father with the same glory they 
once shared. This is a tenseless statement. God knows tenselessly prior to creation that 
the Son utters such and such a statement on 30 A.D. However, because the Son is 
incarnate, the Son, at least the Son qua man knows ‗now‘ that He utters such a statement 
toward the Father. The problem with this is that the Son qua man was not with the Father 
prior to incarnation. If we consider God to be a se then God could have chosen not to 
have created a world in which He became incarnate. The human nature is an accidental 
property and is not ontologically necessary for God the Son to have. But because God 
decided to create the kind of w’ that He created, then such a world would include the 
Son‘s being incarnate at t’ uttering His desire to be glorified with the same glory He 
shared with the Father before the world began. Thus, if the Son experiences no change in 
consciousness, then, it would seem that Scripture‘s speaking of the Son‘s longing to be 
reunited with His Father in the same glory they shared before the world was would make 
no sense. One could escape this by claiming that the Son timelessly has this longing to be 
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reunited with the Father in the same glory, but this too, does not seem to make sense. 
Why would the Son make such a statement? As Philippians 2:7 claims, the Son 
―emptied‖ Himself of His glory. One can only empty oneself through conscious efforts to 
do so. The Son‘s decision to empty Himself and to become a servant by adding on flesh 
was not a sole act of the Son. The Son‘s decision was not apart from the Father nor was it 
apart from the Spirit; rather, it was the plan of the entire Godhead. We have here in the 
Son, God‘s self-condescension in taking on human flesh, dwelling among men and 
becoming a servant.  
 
  
Two Model of God’s Temporal Mode of Existence:                                                                
   
 
Relative Timelessness 
 
 The first model we shall examine, God as ―relative timelessness,‖ is advocated by 
Alan Padgett. According to Padgett, there are some problems with the ―everlasting‖ view. 
The main problem with the everlasting view, claims Padgett, is theological inadequacy. 
He believes that this view is the one most straightforward with Scripture; however, one 
area it neglects is God‘s transcendence from time. In light of modern scientific 
discoveries, along with the Biblical doctrine of creation ex nihilo, it seems that time, 
along with the rest of the universe came into existence through a definite beginning. 
Padgett believes that any view on eternity must distinguish God the Creator from the 
creation.
 20
 He is the ―infinite Creator of all things, including time itself. God should in  
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some way transcend time.‖21   
 Despite the shortcomings of the everlasting view, Padgett thinks that atemporality 
has several problems of its own. One problem is that there can be no such thing as 
libertarian free will. If the timeless view is correct, then God determines all things. 
Secondly, in order to maintain the divine timelessness view, one must hold to a B-theory  
of time.
22
   
 As far as relative timelessness is concerned, there are two important aspects to 
Padgett‘s theory. First, God is the Ground of time. What Padgett means by this is that 
God could have existed timelessly within a timeless world. However, the kind of life that 
God has chosen is a life that is dynamic and changing and such a life is the ground of our 
own temporal world.
23
 Padgett clarifies: 
 I have suggested that we understand time to be the dimension of the possibility of change. 
This dimension, like space, is a creation of God‘s. The world could have been different. 
God‘s choice (eternally) to live a certain kind of life, a temporal and changing life, is the 
ground of time. Time need not have been in God‘s creation.24  
 
By ―changing,‖ Padgett does not mean that God changes in His divine nature, character, 
or perfections. He affirms God‘s immutability in those areas; rather, any change is a 
change in God‘s activity toward a temporal and changing world in which He sustains.25 
 The second aspect to Padgett‘s theory is that God is the Lord over time. God is 
completely in control of what transpires in His creation. Nothing takes place apart from 
God‘s perfect power, knowledge and will. Moreover, God sustains the world through 
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constant sustaining power, without which the world would cease to exist. God is not 
bound by time nor is He bound by those imperfections that are a part of time, yet He can 
act within time without any restraints.
26
 Now that these two central aspects have been 
examined, let us turn to Padgett‘s definition of relative timelessness.    
 To say that God‘s eternity is relative timelessness means that there is no measure 
to God‘s time. Padgett‘s own use of the word ―timelessness‖ differs from that of 
eternalism. Timelessness in the strictest sense means that something lacks ―both temporal 
extension and temporal location.‖27 But this is not what Padgett means when he refers to 
God‘s relative timelessness. Padgett distinguishes between ―time as pure duration‖ and 
time as ―the measurement of change.‖ 28 ―Measured time‖ is relative to individual 
reference frames. This kind of time depends on the laws of nature and can be measured 
by instruments, such as clocks. But God, on the other hand, transcends ―measured time‖, 
since He is the Creator of space-time. He cannot be subjected to the Laws of Nature, i.e., 
―He does not conform to any order of nature that would cause him to repeat the same 
process over and over again in a uniform manner, as an isochronic clock is supposed to 
do.‖29 The Laws of Nature can be changed and altered, since they are contingent and 
dependent on God for their existence.
30
 On the other hand, ―relative timelessness‖, 
suggests Padgett ―attends to the intuition that God cannot be ‗contained‘ within any 
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created category.‖31 God‘s time is not created in the same sense as ―measured time‖ nor 
is it ―made at any time.‖32 Rather, ―God is the metaphysical precondition‖ for His own 
temporal mode of existence, His own eternity which is relative timelessness, i.e., pure 
duration.
33
 On his notion of ―relative timelessness‖ Padgett claims: 
 God‘s time is infinite, but it is also immeasurable. . . . In other words, God is timeless 
relative to created time of our space-time universe. . . .any temporal measure depends on the 
laws of nature (which in turn depend on the created structures and regularities of natural 
objects). Temporal metrics are relative to inertial frames of reference; they change with 
strong gravity or great speed. There is no reason to assume that such metrics apply to God.
34
   
 
Thus God as the Creator of space-time is not a part of physical measured space-time. 
God‘s own eternity is grounded in and ontologically dependent on God‘s own life and 
Being.  
 
The Two-Phase View 
 
 The second view we are concerned with is (what I shall call) the ―Two-phase 
view.‖35 According to Craig, if God is timeless without creation and temporal subsequent 
to creation, then there must be two phases to God‘s life: one timeless and one temporal. 
At the moment God creates He enters into a dynamic relationship to creation.
36
 Craig 
claims:  
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 It seems to me, therefore, that it is not only coherent but also plausible that God exiting 
changelessly alone without creation is timeless and that He enters time at the moment of 
creation in virtue of his real relation to the temporal universe. The image of God existing 
idly before creation is just that: a figment of the imagination. Given that time began to exist, 
the most plausible view of God‘s relationship to time is that He is timeless without creation 
and temporal subsequent to creation. 
37
 
 
If God is temporal sans creation, then how are we to understand God‘s temporality? 
Given the nature of the expanding universe and that time is moving unidirectionally, it is 
possible that there is, based on General Relativity Theory, one overarching reference 
frame. This reference frame is what Craig calls ―cosmic time.‖ 38 He asserts: ―[t]hus, not 
only do we know that a privileged cosmic time in which the universe evolves exists, but 
because the earth is approximately at rest with respect to our galactic fundamental 
particle, we also have a fair idea of what time is!‖39 Craig believes that ―cosmic time‖ is 
the measurement of God‘s ―metaphysical‖ or ―ontological‖ time. The reason for this is 
that since creation those movements which occur in cosmic time ―coincide with the 
moments of metaphysical time.‖40 He asserts: 
 From God‘s perspective in real, A-series time, there is an absolute present in which He is 
now conscious of what is happening in the universe, and He is now causally sustaining the 
events in the universe. But if…God‘s causally sustaining the universe in being is 
simultaneous with the events being so sustained, then there must be an absolute, cosmic 
―now‖ which describes the state of the universe as it is present to God.41  
 
Ontological time, which is ―real time,‖ claims Craig, proceeds cosmic time and thus has  
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―its own intrinsic metric.‖42  But once God creates the universe, including physical time, 
the moments of cosmic time begin to coincide with the moments of metaphysical time. 
While ontological time exists in such a way that it is not bound by the laws and rules of 
the universe; nevertheless, cosmic time serves as a ―clock‖ to measure God‘s time.43 
Since God could have chosen not to create, then both cosmic time and ontological time 
are contingent. God could have been content not to have created, and according to Craig, 
would have remained timeless.
44
 Yet, now that God has created and entered into this 
temporal causal relationship with creation, He is ―omnitemporal‖, i.e., that God ―exists at 
every time that ever exists.‖ 45 
    
Relative Timelessness or the Two-Phase View 
 
 Both Craig and Padgett present possible options for the defender of divine 
temporality, but here the question naturally arises: which view is best? Both views take 
into consideration God‘s transcendence and immanence. Like eternalism, God is 
spaceless, i.e., He completely transcends the space-time universe. Further, God is not 
enmeshed in the physical processes of the created world nor is He bound by the laws of 
nature. Concerning God‘s immanence, God is religiously available to His creatures. Not 
only is God aware of what is going on in the space-time universe, but He can act directly 
in response to His creatures.  
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 One criticism of the two-phase view is that such a view is incoherent.
46
 How can a 
God who is essentially timeless become temporal? If divine timelessness and absolute 
immutability entail one another, then would not a God who is timelessly eternal be 
absolutely immutable? But how can a God who is absolutely immutable change from a 
state of timelessness to a state of temporality or to even decide to become temporal? An 
obvious out for Craig is to deny absolute immutability. But if one were to deny absolute 
immutability, then could it be said that God is timeless?    
 Another problem with Craig‘s view is that he wants to say that cosmic time 
measures God‘s metaphysical time. The problem with this is that ―assumptions are made 
about how God is in himself based upon how God seems from a limited temporal 
perspective.‖47 But, as Padgett points out, if God exists outside of the universe, then no 
means of measuring time within our universe can be used to measure God‘s time. Such 
would have no meaning for things that exist outside of our space-time universe.  
 Padgett‘s view, though, is not without its problems. Craig raises the following 
objection to immeasurable time: 
 Metric conventionalism is the view that there is no objective fact of the matter 
concerning the comparative lengths of separate temporal intervals. But metric 
conventionalism does not hold that there really are no intervals of time or that no 
intervals can be objectively compared with respect to length. . . . For in the case of 
intervals which are proper parts of other intervals, the proper parts are factually 
shorter than their encompassing parts.  
  But this implies that prior to creation God has endured through a beginningless 
series of longer and longer intervals. In fact we can even say that such a time must be 
infinite. For the past is finite if and only if there is a first interval of time. (An 
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interval is first if there exists no interval earlier than it, or if there exists no interval 
greater than  t but having the same end point.)
48
 
 
However, Craig misses Padgett‘s point. Padgett defines ―time as the dimension of the 
possibility of change.‖ Yet, before the first change (B.F.C), it is conceivable to think of 
God existing prior to creation in an immeasurable time.
49
 
 There is, let us say, an unending, nonfinite and immeasurable ―time‖ B.F.C. If you 
want to call this an ―interval,‖ fine, but it is a very odd one! Any division into 
subintervals is wholly arbitrary; in fact there are no ―divisions‖ in this temporal 
interval B.F.C.
50
  
 
Thus for Padgett, it is feasible to think of God existing in a kind of temporal state, apart 
from any change and measure. 
 Given the above two views, how are we to understand God‘s temporal modes of 
existence. I believe the best way is to take a synthetic approach between these two views. 
Before creation, God exists, as Padgett points out, in an ―immeasurable,‖ ―nonfinite‖ 
state. There is no change until God creates. Yet, at the moment God creates, he enters 
into a dynamic and active relationship with His creation. Furthermore, the flow of 
metaphysical time is not based on ―cosmic time‖ but as Garret DeWeese points out, ―the 
causal succession of mental states in God‘s conscious life grounds the flow and direction 
of metaphysical time.‖51 Yet, according to Garrett DeWeese, no intrinsic metric in 
metaphysical time may be required. Even if events within the universe are placed on a 
―‗one-to-one‘ correspondence with moments of metaphysical time, one could give no 
sense to the statement that a certain duration of metaphysical time lasted a certain number 
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of seconds (days, years, and so on).‖52 However, like Craig, God is omnitemporal, i.e., 
since creation, God ―exists at every time that ever exists.‖53 
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CONCLUSION 
 
  
 The purpose of this study was three-fold. First, this thesis sought to examine the 
theological and philosophical reasons for holding to the doctrine of divine timelessness. 
We began our study by taking a look at the four primary contributors to the doctrine of 
divine timelessness within Western culture: Augustine, Boethius, Anselm and Aquinas. 
There seems to be at least four prominent features which make up the sine qua non of the 
eternalists position: (1) God is the Greatest Possible Being; (2) It is better to have 
completeness of life than to exist in parts, i.e., to have one‘s life exist as a whole; (3) God 
is the first cause of all things; (4) There is an ontological distinction between an infinite 
Creator and a finite creation. Given these four principles, we can form the following 
propositions: 
 (a) God is the most perfect being 
 (b) That which is perfect does not change (for change requires existing in parts) 
 (c) Temporal objects change 
 (d) A temporal being could not be perfect because such a being would change 
 (e) Therefore, God is not temporal 
 (f)  Therefore, God is timelessly eternal 
 
Central to the medieval theists‘ conception of divine timeless were the notions of God as 
a perfect being, and that a perfect being could not change.  
 Next we examined Paul Helm defense of the divine timeless view. Helm builds a 
series of arguments for the coherence of the doctrine of divine timelessness. He argues 
that only a God that is strongly immutable can do those things attributed to God by 
scripture and only a timelessly eternal God preserves the doctrine of absolute 
immutability. We concluded that Helm‘s view of divine timelessness is coherent, but 
rests on an understanding of God‘s absolute immutable.  
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 The second purpose of this study was to determine whether the eternalist has 
justification for holding to a strong immutability and to see if the doctrine of divine 
timelessness coheres with other core Christian doctrines. There are at least three ways to 
understand God‘s immutability. The first way is to reject immutability altogether. But 
this view was rejected because scripture affirms that God is immutable. The second way 
of understanding divine immutability is to say that God can change in no sense. This is 
the position of eternalism. The eternalist uses the word ―strong‖ to qualify his version of 
immutability, but it is more fitting to suggest that the eternalist conception of 
immutability is absolute. For on this view, not only is God unchanging, but he could not 
ever change in any sense. However, such a conception of the doctrine of immutability 
seems to negate scriptures affirmation that there are some ways in which God changes, 
e.g., in His activity. Therefore, we are left with the understanding that God is immutable 
in some sense. Further, we concluded that God is immutable in His ontological nature or 
essence, His character, His will, and His divine plan and purposes. Yet, it is God‘s 
ontological immutability which makes it possible for God to act in the world and to 
change in his relationships toward His creatures. Finally, concerning God‘s immutability, 
we determined the scriptural concept is more akin to Karl Barth‘s notion of ―constancy.‖ 
God is constant in His being. He is stable and does not change in His ways.  
 After examining the doctrine of immutability, we examined two objections to the 
doctrine of divine timelessness. The first objection focused on the doctrine of creation. If 
God sustains a temporal creation, and the A-theory of time is true, then He could not be a 
timeless being, since He would be in a temporal causal relationship with events that are 
coming into and out of existence. A possible out for the defender of divine timelessness is 
108 
 
to hold to the B-theory of time, i.e., there is no true temporal becoming in the world. All 
events and episodes are equally real within the four-dimensional space-time manifold. 
But given the expansion of the universe, the problem of temporal becoming, and an 
inconsistency between the doctrines of creation and divine omnipotence and the B-theory 
of time, there is reason to reject eternalism‘s employment of the B-theory. The second 
objection observed was an argument from the incarnation of the Son of God. We 
concluded that Scripture and the early Fathers held that the Son of God, through the 
incarnation, entered into space-time and that whatever it means to say that God is eternal, 
that understanding must include such a possibility as the Son of God‘s entering into the 
space-time universe. Further, we presented a philosophical argument for the Son‘s 
temporality. In this argument we showed that the defender of divine timelessness must 
hold to either a form of Nestorianism or Adoptionism in order to justify the doctrine of 
divine timelessness with the incarnation. 
 The third purpose of this study was to make an attempt at formulating a coherent 
understanding of God‘s temporal mode of existence. Two views were examined: God as 
―Relative Timelessness‖ and the ―Two-phase view.‖ We concluded that a synthesis 
position between Relative Timelessness and Omnitemporality best explains God‘s 
temporal mode of existence.       
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